University of Minnesota Law School

Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2021

Standing Up to the Treasury: Applying the Procedural Standing
Analysis to Post-Mayo, Pre-Enforcement APA Treasury
Challenges, by Casey N. Epstein here.
Casey N. Epstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr

Recommended Citation
Epstein, Casey N., "Standing Up to the Treasury: Applying the Procedural Standing Analysis to Post-Mayo,
Pre-Enforcement APA Treasury Challenges, by Casey N. Epstein here." (2021). Minnesota Law Review.
3308.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3308

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Note
Standing Up to the Treasury: Applying the Procedural Standing
Analysis to Post-Mayo, Pre-Enforcement APA Treasury
Challenges
Casey N. Epstein*
INTRODUCTION
During the tumultuous debate over the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act (TCJA),1 the bill’s provisions to cap state and local tax (SALT) deductions2 came to symbolize the TCJA’s partisan nature, stoking controversy around the hastily passed legislation.3 The SALT cap
* J.D. Candidate 2021, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2014, Clark
University. I am grateful to Professor Kristin Hickman for helping me develop this topic
and offering guidance along the way. I would also like to thank Lead Note & Comment
Editors Sam Cleveland and Meredith Gingold for spending a significant amount of time
helping me edit and frame this Note. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Joey Barrett,
and dedicate this Note to my daughter, Yael Epstein. Copyright © 2021 by Casey N.
Epstein.
1. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified in
scattered sections of I.R.C.). While the 2017 Act is colloquially referred to as the “Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act” (TCJA)—the name this Note will use—because of the reconciliation
process used to pass the TCJA, its official title is “To Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018.”
See Eli Watkins, Senate Rules Force Republicans To Go with Lengthy Name for Tax Plan,
CNN POL. (Dec. 19, 2017, 10:14 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/19/politics/tax
-bill-name-delay/index.html [https://perma.cc/K2FD-6SVE].
2. § 11042, 131 Stat. at 2085–86. Under the SALT deduction scheme, taxpayers
can deduct state and local real estate taxes as well as income or sales taxes. I.R.C.
§ 164(a); see also GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF ELIMINATING THE STATE AND
LOCAL TAX DEDUCTION 4 (2017), https://gfoaorg.cdn.prismic.io/gfoaorg/dfef3d6d
-69c1-4d83-97a7-ae2f68e1692a_RCC+Report+on+SALT+Deduction-092017_Final
.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5MQ-Y8BR]. SALT deductions decrease the double state-federal taxation assessed to an individual. As of 2015, almost thirty percent of Americans
utilized SALT deductions. Id. SALT deductions disproportionately benefit the wealthy
who live in high-tax states. See Jared Walczak, The State and Local Tax Deduction: A
Primer, TAX FOUND. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://files.taxfoundation.org/2017031514
2330/Tax-Foundation-FF545.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TVN-YUZZ].
3. See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman & Patricia Cohen, It Started as a Tax Cut. Now It
Could Change American Life, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/29/business/republican-tax-cut.html [https://perma.cc/6UCJ-LXKF]; Annie Nova & Darla Mercado, How These States Are Rebelling Against the GOP Tax Code,
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appeared to target wealthy citizens in high-tax “blue” states in an apparent attempt to economically kneecap wealthy Democrats.4 In response, many of these blue states adopted “workarounds” to the SALT
legislation.5
The Treasury Department worked quickly to eliminate these
states’ workarounds, preventing them from circumventing the TCJA’s
SALT laws by promulgating new regulations in the summer of 2019.6
Less than a month after the Treasury issued these SALT regulations,
the same “workaround” blue states attempted to invalidate these new
regulations in New Jersey v. Mnuchin, arguing that the Treasury’s

CNBC (Jan. 23, 2018, 2:34 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/23/how-these
-states-are-rebelling-against-the-new-gop-tax-code.html [https://perma.cc/6EM8
-VHEH]. Even several years after the TCJA was passed, the SALT deductions cap continues to stoke controversy. See Jim Tankersley, The Trump Tax Cuts Were Supposed To
Depress Housing Prices. They Haven’t., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/08/27/business/housing-prices-tax-law.html [https://perma.cc/7KLF
-R4JA]; Michelle Singletary, It’s Time To Pay Taxes—and, Boy, Are People Steamed About
the Trump ‘Tax Cut’ Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2019, 6:51 AM), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/03/07/its-time-pay-taxes-boy-are-people
-steamed-about-trump-tax-cut-bill [https://perma.cc/M647-979Q]. For an example of
the sloppiness of the TCJA, see DEBORAH A. GEIER, U.S. FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS 2021, at 420 n.28 (2020), describing the “internally inconsistent” capital
gains treatment of self-created patents under the Internal Revenue Code.
4. See Bob Bryan, Top Trump Advisor Says the GOP Tax Bill Is ‘Death to Democrats,’ BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 5, 2017, 11:23 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/trump
-gop-tax-bill-democrats-salt-deduction-text-details-2017-12 [https://perma.cc/PY6U
-EA6H]. Although the TCJA targeted Democrats, the SALT caps also negatively impacted wealthy conservatives in high-tax states like New Jersey. See Alana Abramson,
These Are the 12 House Republicans Who Voted Against the Tax Bill, TIME (Dec. 19, 2017,
5:44 PM), https://time.com/5072519/house-republicans-voted-against-tax-bill
[https://perma.cc/28VN-QKJY].
5. Laura Davison & Lynnley Browning, New York, New Jersey Pursue Another Battle in SALT Deduction War, BLOOMBERG (July 17, 2019, 10:43 AM), https://www
.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-17/new-york-new-jersey-pursue-another
-battle-in-salt-deduction-war [https://perma.cc/G7RN-DBNR]. These “workarounds”
“allow[ed] residents to donate to a state-created charitable fund instead of paying
property taxes [which] could then be written off as a charitable gift on an individual’s
federal taxes [to] get a state tax credit.” Id.
6. The Treasury issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on August 27, 2018,
before promulgating final rules in the summer of 2019. Contributions in Exchange for
State or Local Tax Credits, 83 Fed. Reg. 43,563 (proposed Aug. 27, 2018) (to be codified
at Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(3)); Contributions in Exchange for State or Local Tax Credits, 84 Fed. Reg. 27,513 (June 13, 2019) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(h)(3)).
These regulations eliminated state-created charitable funds, preventing the states
from implementing their workaround schemes. Id.; see supra note 5.
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promulgation was “arbitrary and capricious” in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7
Plaintiff-states’ challenge to the Treasury’s SALT regulations is
not only a long-shot on the merits,8 but it is also unclear whether the
states can even command judicial review. In order for the courts to
find the plaintiffs’ claims justiciable, the states must survive two
threshold hurdles for administrative actions against the Treasury: the
Anti-Injunction Act (AIA)9 and the doctrine of standing.10
The question of whether these plaintiff-states can even command
judicial review is illustrative of a commonplace problem in suing the
Treasury over procedurally infirm rules and regulations. While all
plaintiffs require standing to maintain their suits, courts are inconsistent in applying the standing analysis to pre-enforcement administrative claims, particularly those against the Treasury.11
Until recently it was clear that plaintiffs could not secure judicial
review for administrative challenges to the Treasury prior to enforcement.12 That prohibition, however, unnecessarily undermined the
APA.13 Courts are now granting judicial review for some pre-enforcement administrative challenges to the Treasury; however, it is unclear
whether such plaintiffs have standing and even how courts should assess plaintiffs’ standing.14
Although the field of administrative law generally allows plaintiffs to bring pre-enforcement APA challenges,15 the Treasury has historically enjoyed a blanket exemption from such pre-enforcement
7. Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 2–3, New Jersey v. Mnuchin,
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 2019) (No. 1:19-cv-06642), https://www.nj.gov/oag/
newsreleases19/2019-0717_SALT-Complaint_As-Filed.pdf [https://perma.cc/PZ4U
-LWRX]; Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706. This lawsuit
constitutes these states’ second attempt to overturn the new SALT law—prior to this
administrative claim, the states filed a constitutional challenge to the SALT legislation
itself which was denied on the merits and is currently pending appeal. See New York v.
Mnuchin, 408 F. Supp. 3d 399, 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
8. Davison & Browning, supra note 5 (quoting Duke University law professor
Lawrence Zelenak).
9. I.R.C. § 7421.
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.1.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra notes 132–37 and accompanying text.
15. See Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967). This Note focuses on
pre-enforcement APA actions—standing is a non-issue for post-enforcement challenges as plaintiffs almost certainly satisfy the injury-in-fact and related standing requirements. See infra notes 83–86 and accompanying text.
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actions due to the tax-specific AIA.16 This statute prevents taxpayers
from challenging their tax liability before the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) formally assesses the taxpayer’s liability or the taxpayer pays
their tax liability in full.17
The question of whether the AIA does, in fact, bar pre-enforcement APA claims has become a hot topic of late, with now-Justice Kavanaugh concluding that the AIA does preclude APA pre-enforcement
claims in his 2015 D.C. Circuit Florida Bankers opinion18 and the Sixth
Circuit issuing a strongly divided denial of rehearing en banc in the
2019 CIC Services opinion.19 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari for CIC Services to resolve this question.20
Even if plaintiffs survive the AIA, they must still establish standing for their claim to be justiciable.21 Because the AIA has historically
served as the primary barrier to entry for taxpayer pre-enforcement
challenges to the Treasury, this specific standing question has received little attention from the courts and the academy.22 This silence
has created a legal vacuum. While this vacuum was relatively unimportant until recently,23 courts are now granting plaintiffs passage
through the AIA gateway, necessitating actual analysis of whether
plaintiffs have standing to sue.24
Perhaps unsurprisingly, recent district court decisions evaluating
standing for pre-enforcement APA challenges to the Treasury are inconsistent in their standing analyses.25 These decisions evidence the
16. I.R.C. § 7421.
17. See infra Part I.A. Thus, a taxpayer may challenge the Treasury/IRS once they
have paid the tax that the IRS assessed against them.
18. Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065, 1067–68 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (holding the APA pre-enforcement challenge to be non-justiciable under the
AIA).
19. CIC Servs., LLC v. IRS, 925 F.3d 247, 259 (6th Cir.), reh’g en banc denied, 936
F.3d 501 (6th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 2737 (2020) (mem.).
20. Id. The Supreme Court held oral argument on CIC Services on December 1,
2020. While the Justices indicated significant skepticism of the IRS’s position—and
seem likely to rule in favor of CIC Services—the Court has not released its opinion at
the time of this Note going to print. See Jeffery Leon & Aysha Bagchi, SCOTUS Justices
Grill IRS in Fight over Tax Reporting Rule, BLOOMBERG TAX (Dec. 1, 2020, 12:33 PM),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/supreme-court-peppers-irs-with
-tough-questions-in-tax-rule-fight [https://perma.cc/67Q8-AWWP].
21. See infra Part I.B.2.
22. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
23. See the discussion of tax exceptionalism in Part I.A.2, infra, which explains
that standing was not a pressing issue because tax exceptionalism and the AIA fully
barred all such challenges.
24. See infra Part II.A.2.
25. See id.
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beginnings of a jurisdictional split.26 Should courts apply disparate
standing analyses to the same pre-enforcement APA question, they
will inject a significant amount of confusion into these administrative
claims—confusion that will harm all parties.27 Instead of courts concocting unique standing analyses, they should take a uniform and consistent approach to plaintiffs’ standing inquiries.
Moreover, because pre-enforcement administrative actions necessarily occur before the claimant is harmed by the challenged action,
these claims demand a special standing analysis with relaxed requirements.28 The Supreme Court sanctioned the use of such a “procedural
standing” doctrine in the seminal case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
where Justice Scalia noted that “procedural rights are special.”29
A number of courts utilize a relaxed procedural standing inquiry
for administrative claims that have yet to directly injure the plaintiff.30
This analysis eases the requirements that plaintiffs demonstrate that
they have been directly injured as well as that their injury is redressable by the courts.31 Because of the unique nature of a procedural injury, which often has not yet injured the plaintiff but will injure them
in the future, courts that invoke the ordinary standing requirements
would foreclose the plaintiff’s opportunity to challenge such a procedural injury.32
While some courts invoke the procedural standing doctrine in
pre-enforcement APA claims, including some administrative challenges to the Treasury, many others omit any mention of the doctrine.33 The judiciary’s inconsistency in utilizing procedural standing
creates numerous corollary problems, including undermining the
core policy of stare decisis, treating like plaintiffs alike, and furthering
the confusion over whether the Treasury enjoys—or should enjoy—
special status because of its financial importance to the government.34
This Note aims to rectify courts’ pre-enforcement standing analyses in APA pre-enforcement suits against the Treasury. This Note explains the current problem of pre-enforcement APA taxpayer
26. Id.
27. See infra note 100 and accompanying text.
28. See infra Part I.B.3.
29. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
30. See infra Part I.B.3.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See infra Part II.A.
34. See infra Part II.B.
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standing, charts the rationale for the special procedural standing doctrine, and provides a coherent system of analysis for pre-enforcement
administrative challenges to the Treasury going forward. Ultimately,
this Note argues that the courts’ current analytical framework for preenforcement APA standing is harmfully inconsistent. Instead, the judiciary should apply a uniform and consistent standing analysis that
regularly utilizes the procedural standing doctrine. This solution will
increase consistency and efficiency in the courts, provide clear expectations to both plaintiffs and agencies, and ensure that parties have
remedies to harmful Treasury promulgations that violate the APA.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I describes the evolution of
tax exceptionalism—the doctrine granting the Treasury special status
in the eyes of the law—the AIA, standing, and the procedural standing
doctrine. Part II explores the historical difficulty in obtaining standing
to challenge the Treasury in pre-enforcement APA claims, the currently developing jurisdictional split over this standing analysis, and
the resulting legal tensions and problems created by the courts’ inconsistencies. Part III recommends that courts employ greater use of the
procedural standing doctrine to ensure fair and consistent application
of the standing doctrine and explains how consistent use of the procedural standing doctrine will ameliorate current problems.
Courts should allow plaintiffs to challenge the Treasury for administratively infirm actions. Whether their claims are meritorious or
not, this Note argues that plaintiffs, like the states in New Jersey v.
Mnuchin, should have standing to sue the Treasury for pre-enforcement APA violations. Ultimately, these plaintiffs, like everyone else,
should have an opportunity to be heard in court.
I. STANDING, THE APA, AND PRE-ENFORCEMENT
ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES TO TREASURY REGULATIONS
While most agencies have been subject to pre-enforcement APA
challenges for seventy years, the Treasury enjoyed special protections
from administrative law challenges under the doctrine of “tax exceptionalism.” These special protections included immunity from pre-enforcement APA suits under the threshold justiciability barrier of the
Anti-Injunction Act and, by implication, standing. Recent jurisprudence seemingly eliminated tax exceptionalism—casting doubt on the
Treasury’s historic protection from pre-enforcement APA claims.
Courts, however, are still finding their way in a post-tax exceptionalism world, including learning how to navigate the oft-confounding
standing doctrine in pre-enforcement administrative cases.
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This Part outlines the evolution of tax exceptionalism and the justiciability doctrines of the AIA, standing, and procedural standing doctrines. Section A describes the history of the APA and tax exceptionalism. Section B describes the threshold barriers of the AIA and standing
that serve to bar plaintiffs’ administrative challenges against the
Treasury. Section B also outlines the relaxed procedural standing doctrine that is central to this Note’s solution.
In sum, this Part highlights the currently-in-flux doctrine of
standing as applied to pre-enforcement administrative challenges to
the Treasury.
A. TAX AGENCIES AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Tax exceptionalism evolved slowly over time, beginning in the
1960s with the Treasury’s fairly regular compliance with the APA, to
its regular non-compliance (and the corresponding judicial acceptance of its non-compliance) in the 1980s, to today’s ostensible, albeit still uncertain, rejection of tax exceptionalism. This Section outlines the history of the on-again-off-again relationship between tax
and administrative law. Subsection 1 summarizes administrative
agency law and the history of the APA. Subsection 2 details the relationship between the Treasury and the APA, the history of tax exceptionalism, and the current debate over the Treasury’s immunity from
APA pre-enforcement challenges.
1. Administrative Agencies and the APA
Congress has long delegated its powers to executive branch agencies. Indeed, the First Congress established multiple agencies, including the Treasury, under George Washington’s helm.35 The judiciary
has historically upheld such delegations so long as Congress provides
some—really any—“intelligible principle” to guide the agency.36
35. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65 (1789); see
Jerry Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787–
1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1277 (2006).
36. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928); see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (“Accordingly, this Court has
deemed it ‘constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy,
the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.’”
(quoting Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946))).
Note, however, that the “intelligible principle” doctrine has faced recent criticism
from multiple Supreme Court Justices. While the doctrine currently remains in force,
the Court may limit or eliminate the intelligible principle theory in the future to require
that Congress provide more specific delineated agency operational guidelines. See
Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 77 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring);
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Courts justify such broad delegations of powers to agencies by necessity, as Congress often lacks the subject matter expertise, time, and resources to enumerate the plethora of regulations required by a given
piece of legislation.37 Notably, agencies, using congressional powers
under the executive branch, often simultaneously wield adjudicatory,
legislative, and executive powers.38 This consolidation of agency authority has led to separation of powers concerns, particularly where
delegations of authority are vague or overbroad.39
Congress’s enactment of the APA in 1946 codified specific procedural rules that agencies must follow in promulgating regulations
with the force of law (i.e., “legislative rules”).40 The APA provides that,
prior to finalizing legislative rules, agencies must issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) and solicit public notice-and-comment,41
Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Paul v.
United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (mem.) (Kavanaugh, J., statement) (“I write
separately because Justice Gorsuch’s scholarly analysis of the Constitution’s nondelegation doctrine in his Gundy dissent may warrant further consideration in future
cases.”).
37. See, e.g., Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“The Constitution
has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will enable it to perform its function. . . . Without capacity
to give authorizations of that sort we should have the anomaly of a legislative power
which . . . would be but a futility.”); Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372 (“[O]ur jurisprudence has
been driven by a practical understanding that in our increasingly complex society . . .
Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”).
38. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of
Powers Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492–93 (1987).
39. See Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. at 74 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Framers’
dedication to the separation of powers has been well-documented, if only half-heartedly honored.”); Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2144 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“If the separation
of powers means anything, it must mean that Congress cannot give the executive
branch a blank check to write a code of conduct governing private conduct for a halfmillion people.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 266 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott
ed., 1898) (“The accumulation of all powers, Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary, in
the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”).
40. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706. See generally
Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 472–509 (2013).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)–(c); see Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(invalidating agency promulgation because the final rule was not a “logical outgrowth”
of the NOPR). Note that the APA provides agencies several exemptions from soliciting
public comment, including for “good cause”—“when the agency for good cause finds . . .
that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary
to the public interest.” 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B); see KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 525 (2d ed. 2014) (“Substantively, APA § 553(b)(B)
allows for good cause where . . . [the rule is] contrary to the public interest if ‘the interest of the public would be defeated by any requirement of advance notice.’” (quoting
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
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disclose data relied upon in making the rule,42 issue a concise general
statement of the basis for the rule,43 refrain from promulgating rules
arbitrarily and capriciously,44 and conduct an impact study on the
rule’s effect on small businesses.45
Moreover, the APA provides a broad standard of judicial review
for challenges to agency actions, allowing aggrieved parties to contest
agency regulations that violate the APA’s requirements.46 In Abbott
Laboratories, the Supreme Court expressly held that this standard of
judicial review includes “pre-enforcement review”—i.e., review of
agency actions that will, but have not yet, injured a party.47 This review ensures that a party is not put in the catch-22 of choosing “between abandoning his rights or risking prosecution.”48
The APA thus “serves as a second best proxy for the legislative
process” and functions as a check on anti-democratic agency actions.49
Indeed, Congress anticipated that “‘public interest’ litigants . . . would
prod [an] agency to go further in implementing its statutory

30–31 (1947))).
For examples of successful good cause exemptions from notice-and-comment period requirements, see Haw. Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. FAA, 51 F.3d 212, 214 (9th
Cir. 1995), which allowed the quick adoption of air safety regulations after a wave of
fatal air tour incidents; and Jifry v. FAA, 370 F.3d 1174, 1178–80 (D.C. Cir. 2004), which
allowed the adoption of airline pilot certification requirements shortly after the September 11 terrorist attacks.
42. See Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
But see Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 246–47 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing no such duty exists (citing Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978))).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see United States v. N.S. Food Prods., 568 F.2d 240, 252–53
(2d Cir. 1977).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); see Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 41–44 (1983); Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42, 55
(2011) (“[T]he [agency’s] approach must be tied, even if loosely, to the purposes of the
immigration laws or the appropriate operation of the immigration system.”).
45. 5 U.S.C. § 603(a); see, e.g., Silver v. IRS, No. 19-cv-247, 2019 WL 7168625, at
*2 (D.D.C. Dec. 24, 2019).
46. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); see Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
140 (1967) (holding that the APA “embodies [a] basic presumption of judicial review”).
47. Abbott Lab’ys, 387 U.S. at 141.
48. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007).
49. See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to the Treasury’s
(Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153, 1204 (2008).
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mandate.”50 While judicial review of agency regulatory actions grants
putative plaintiffs a powerful tool to ensure that agencies comply with
the APA, courts are not permitted to second-guess agency decisions.
Rather, the judiciary’s role is to ensure agencies’ baseline compliance
with the APA, not to ensure that agencies make the “best” or most optimized decisions.51
2. Tax Agencies and Tax Exceptionalism
As an agency, the Treasury is ostensibly subject to the APA, yet
the relationship between the Treasury and the APA is contentious.
When the APA was first enacted in 1946, the Treasury followed its requirements closely, conscientiously evaluating whether a given promulgation constituted a legislative, interpretative, or procedural action.52 Over time, however, due to regulatory backlogs, an increase in
specific congressional grants of authority, a 1980s reorganization of
IRS attorneys, and an internal reduction in tax agency administrative
expertise, the Treasury greatly reduced its compliance with the APA,
and tax law generally diverged from the broader principles of administrative law.53 Scholars dubbed the Treasury’s exemption from administrative law “tax exceptionalism.”
Tax exceptionalism embodies many forms of divergence between
tax and administrative law. For example, virtually every administrative agency enjoys Chevron deference.54 The Treasury, however, received a different—and unique—standard of administrative deference for almost thirty years.55 Another example is the Treasury’s
50. Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131,
1189 (2009).
51. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943) (“If the [agency’s] action rests
upon an administrative determination—an exercise of judgment in an area which Congress has entrusted to the agency—of course it must not be set aside because the reviewing court might have made a different determination were it empowered to do
so.”).
52. See Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack
of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1727, 1796 (2007). Professor Hickman’s article details one theory for
Treasury’s contemporary embrace of tax exceptionalism as a “status quo [that]
evolved slowly.” Id. at 1799. See generally id. at 1795–99.
53. Id. at 1797–99; James M. Puckett, Structural Tax Exceptionalism, 49 GA. L. REV.
1067, 1069 (2015).
54. DANIEL T. SHEDD & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43203, CHEVRON
DEFERENCE: COURT TREATMENT OF AGENCY INTERPRETATIONS OF AMBIGUOUS STATUTES 1
(2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43203.pdf [https://perma.cc/M83P-GA79].
See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
55. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in
Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1542–59 (2006). It took the judiciary more
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frequent failure to comply with APA notice-and-comment rulemaking—a failure that the judiciary regularly condones.56 A third instance
of exceptionalism is the Treasury’s general non-compliance with the
APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard as interpreted in State Farm,
requiring agencies to provide contemporaneous, reasoned explanations for their decisions.57

than twenty-five years after the Chevron decision to hold that the Treasury was also
subject to Chevron deference rather than the previous—and inconsistent—National
Muffler deference standard. Id. at 1538, 1554–56; Kristin E. Hickman, Goodbye National
Muffler! Hello Administrative Law?, TAXPROF BLOG (Jan. 11, 2011), https://taxprof
.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2011/01/hickman-.html [https://perma.cc/C7D9
-EZAM]; see Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011)
(holding that Chevron deference applies to the Treasury); Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n
v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
56. See Hickman, supra note 52, at 1731, 1748 (empirically finding that the Treasury did not perform notice-and-comment rulemaking in about forty percent of promulgations during a three-year period: “Treasury’s rulemaking practices are frequently
inconsistent with APA requirements, or at least skirt doctrinal lines.”); see also id. at
1729 n.9 (noting that Treasury contends that its regulations are mere interpretations,
not subject to the APA). For example, the Treasury often issues and re-issues temporary regulations as a substitute for following notice-and-comment rulemaking—a tactic that the judiciary accepted for thirty years. See Eleanor D. Wood, Note, Rejecting Tax
Exceptionalism: Bringing Temporary Treasury Regulations Back in Line with the APA,
100 MINN. L. REV. 839, 842–43 (2016). Relatedly, the Treasury uses non-legislative subregulatory guidance to create legally binding penalties for taxpayers and tax preparers
who fail to comply with certain revenue rulings and procedures. See Hickman, supra
note 40, at 527–29.
57. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 42–44 (1983). Historically the Internal Revenue Manual instructed that “it
[was] not necessary to justify rules that are being proposed.” IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUAL § 32.1.5.4.7.3(1) (2012) (emphasis added). This claim, however, is “precisely
the opposite of State Farm’s requirement.” Kristin E. Hickman, Administrative Law’s
Growing Influence on U.S. Tax Administration, 3 J. TAX ADMIN. 82, 84–85 (2017); see also
Altera Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 92, 112–13 (2015), rev’d, 926 F.3d 1061
(9th Cir. 2019) (holding IRS regulations as arbitrary and capricious for lacking reasoned explanation).
Yet another example of the Treasury’s tax exceptionalism from administrative law
is its embrace of retrospective regulations—that is, regulations that apply to the past,
without any explanation, in violation of administrative norms. See Andrew Pruitt, Judicial Deference to Retroactive Interpretative Treasury Regulations, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1558, 1580–83 (2011); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213
(1988) (“Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an agency’s convenient
litigating position would be entirely inappropriate.”).
The IRS even regularly argues for—and courts often provide, albeit inconsistently—“phantom regulations”; i.e., non-promulgated “rules” that the IRS believes are
implied from Congress’s delegation of authority. See Amandeep S. Grewal, Substance
over Form? Phantom Regulations and the Internal Revenue Code, 7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J.
42, 45 n.6, 46–60 (2006).
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While these examples generally illustrate the contours of tax exceptionalism and the Treasury’s myriad deviations from administrative law, one last instance of tax exceptionalism, another deviation
from the APA, is centrally relevant to this Note. Notwithstanding the
general administrative law principle that parties can obtain judicial
review to challenge an agency’s regulation prior to said regulation being enforced against the party (pre-enforcement review),58 the Treasury, under the aegis of the AIA, has historically been exempt from administrative pre-enforcement judicial review.59
This creates a dilemma for putative plaintiffs wishing to challenge Treasury regulations: either violate the law—potentially subjecting oneself to civil, or even criminal, penalties—in order to challenge the Treasury’s regulations, or else comply with a law that the
aggrieved party finds administratively infirm.60 Until recently, the
Treasury’s exception from pre-enforcement review appeared ironclad; now, however, it is very much an open question whether the AIA
prevents pre-enforcement review of Treasury regulations in the administrative context.61
The Supreme Court wrote in its 2011 Mayo Foundation opinion:
“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we have expressly recognized the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial
review of administrative action.”62 The Court’s full-throated embrace
58. Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (establishing a presumption in
favor of judicial review); see also 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).
59. See Gerald S. Kerska, Criminal Consequences and the Anti-Injunction Act, 104
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 51, 54–55 (2020).
60. See id.; see also Kristin E. Hickman, A Slow but Steady Demise for Tax Exceptionalism, YOUTUBE, at 17:51–19:09 (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=mzkgaujS1iQ.
61. Compare Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(“The IRS is not special in this regard; no exception exists shielding it . . . from suit under the APA.”), and CIC Servs., LLC v. IRS, 936 F.3d 501, 505 (6th Cir.) (Thapar, J., dissenting) (“[P]eople should not have to risk prison time in order to challenge the lawfulness of government action.”), denying reh’g en banc of 925 F.3d 247 (6th Cir. 2019),
cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 2737 (2020) (mem.), with Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065, 1067–68 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding APA challenge to be nonjusticiable under the AIA), and CIC Servs., LLC v. IRS, 925 F.3d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 2019).
See also Kerska, supra note 59, at 74 (“CIC Services offers the perfect opportunity to end
this unjustified ‘approach to administrative review good for tax law only.’” (quoting
Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011))).
62. Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 55 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)). The Supreme Court held

2021]

STANDING UP TO THE TREASURY

1959

of administrative-law-as-applicable-to-tax-agencies in Mayo Foundation has led a number of courts and scholars to declare that the era of
tax exceptionalism is over.63 Post-Mayo, a growing group of taxpayers
have challenged Treasury regulations on APA grounds with varying
degrees of success.64 Notwithstanding the judiciary’s recent rejection
of tax exceptionalism, scholars continue to hotly debate the merits and
survival of the tax exceptionalism doctrine.65 Whether and to what degree the demise of tax exceptionalism—if it is, in fact, dead66—will
change the results of pre-enforcement APA litigation against tax agencies remains to be seen.

in Mayo Foundation that Chevron deference does apply to tax agencies, rather than the
unique National Muffler deference standard that courts had previously applied. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 268–89 (2014).
64. E.g., Altera Corp. & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015) (invalidating a
Treasury regulation), rev’d, 926 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2019); QinetiQ U.S. Holdings, Inc.
& Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 845 F.3d 555, 564 (4th Cir. 2017) (rejecting taxpayer’s APA
argument); Fla. Bankers Ass’n, 799 F.3d at 1067–68; Chamber of Com. v. IRS, No. 1:16CV-944, 2017 WL 4682049, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017) (invalidating a Treasury
regulation); see also Hickman, supra note 57, at 82.
Three recent high-profile APA pre-enforcement challenges to the IRS have all resulted in taxpayer victories. See Chamber of Com., 2017 WL 4682049; Bullock v. IRS,
401 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (D. Mont. 2019); Silver v. IRS, No. 19-cv-247, 2019 WL 7168625,
at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 24, 2019).
65. See Fla. Bankers Ass’n, 799 F.3d at 1067–68; Cohen, 650 F.3d at 723 (“The IRS
is not special . . . .”); Marie Sapirie, Entering the Next Frontier of Tax and Administrative
Law, 164 TAX NOTES 994 (2019), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/
exempt-organizations/entering-next-frontier-tax-and-administrativelaw/2019/08/
12/29tgv?; Matthew A. Melone, Light on the Mayo: Recent Developments May Diminish
the Impact of Mayo Foundation on Judicial Deference to Tax Regulations, 13 HASTINGS
BUS. L.J. 149, 150 (2017). Compare, e.g., Puckett, supra note 53, at 1068 (“Following
Mayo, it has come into vogue among scholars of tax law to declare the death of tax
exceptionalism . . . . [T]hese pronouncements are exaggerations.”), and Stephanie
Hunter McMahon, The Perfect Process Is the Enemy of the Good Tax: Tax’s Exceptional
Regulatory Process, 35 VA. TAX REV. 553, 612 (2016) (“This is not to suggest the Treasury Department’s operation of the federal income tax is perfect. Nonetheless, it does
do some things right . . . . Most certainly these attempts should not be ignored or jettisoned in the guise of eliminating tax exceptionalism.”), with Hickman, supra note 52, at
1731, Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up To Be Tax
Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 573 (1994) (“[T]he synergistic approach urged by this
Article would facilitate the use of general administrative law learning to inform this
tax issue.”), Hoffer & Walker, supra note 63, and Wood, supra note 56.
66. See, e.g., Hoffer & Walker, supra note 63.
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B. THRESHOLD JUSTICIABILITY BARRIERS FOR TAXPAYER COMPLAINTS
Doctrines of justiciability act as threshold barriers to judicial review for putative plaintiffs. Two threshold barriers in particular—the
AIA and the doctrine of standing—serve as especially thorny and convoluted bars to justiciability for pre-enforcement APA challenges to
the Treasury. While the AIA’s role in limiting these administrative
challenges has received extended recent attention by courts and
scholars, which will perhaps prompt the Supreme Court to resolve the
issue in CIC Services, the role of standing and procedural standing in
this context is only now beginning to be addressed.
The doctrine of standing has changed considerably over the
course of the last century. The Supreme Court repeatedly tightened
the standing requirements over the last thirty years, restricting plaintiffs’ ability to obtain judicial review. At the same time, the Court also
indicated that procedural injuries are subject to a more lenient standard. Notwithstanding the additional complications of two standing
standards, procedural plaintiffs seemingly enjoy “special” status with
respect to standing, allowing them to more easily establish standing
than a plaintiff subject to “traditional” standing rules.
This Section charts the evolution, application, and convolutions
of the standing doctrine and related justiciability barriers to review of
pre-enforcement APA challenges to the Treasury. Subsection 1 provides an overview of the AIA as the initial justiciability barrier to entry
for taxpayers seeking to enforce their administrative-procedural
rights. Subsection 2 summarizes the rules and theory undergirding
the doctrine of standing. Subsection 3 describes the “special” nature
of procedural administrative claims with respect to standing.
1. The AIA: The Treasury’s Primary Protection from PreEnforcement APA Claims
The AIA states that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court.”67
The AIA serves to limit the options of taxpayers who wish to contest
their tax liability to the IRS and Treasury.68 Only once the taxpayer’s
tax is assessed can they file a petition in Tax Court prior to payment.69
Alternatively, the taxpayer can pay the liability in full and then contest
67. I.R.C. § 7421(a). There are a number of statutory exceptions to the AIA, which
are beyond the scope of this Note. See Kristin E. Hickman & Gerald Kerska, Restoring
the Lost Anti-Injunction Act, 103 VA. L. REV. 1683, 1688–89 (2017).
68. Daniel J. Hemel, The Living Anti-Injunction Act, 104 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 74, 74–
75 (2018).
69. Id.
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the assessment in federal district or federal claims court.70 What the
taxpayer cannot do, however, is seek an injunction preventing the IRS
from assessing or collecting a tax prior to any assessment or enforcement.71 In effect, a taxpayer must wait for the IRS to affirmatively assess a liability before the taxpayer may contest the tax. Theoretically,
even if the taxpayer is aware that the IRS believes they have outstanding tax liability, until the Service formally assesses the tax, the taxpayer cannot sue to challenge the IRS’s assessment.72
The AIA thus has potentially serious complications for taxpayers
who wish to challenge IRS regulations that the taxpayer believes violate the APA. If a court holds that an IRS rule or regulation relates to
the “assessment or collection of any tax” as defined in the AIA, then
the AIA would presumably bar the taxpayer from challenging the rule
or regulation before that rule was “enforced” against the taxpayer.
The relevant issue then is whether the AIA bars plaintiffs from
suing the Treasury for an administrative claim under the APA. Historically, the answer seemed obvious, as the AIA barred most pre-enforcement suits against the IRS and Treasury.73 Yet, some courts have
recently allowed APA challenges against the Treasury to bypass the
AIA.74 It is an open question whether the AIA does or does not bar APA
challenges, with judges and scholars taking strong positions on both
sides.75 The Supreme Court may resolve this issue in CIC Services,
70. Id.
71. Id. at 75.
72. Of course, if the IRS waited too long, the assessment statute expiration date—
the IRS’s statute of limitations for assessing a tax—would expire. I.R.C. § 6501.
73. The Supreme Court, in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., provided
a deadly two-part test allowing a taxpayer judicial review only if “under no circumstances could the government ultimately prevail” and “the taxpayer would suffer irreparable injury if collection were effected.” 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962). Professor Kristin
Hickman and Gerald Kerska found only three cases that survived the Williams Packing
test—and none of these opinions were issued by the Supreme Court. Hickman &
Kerska, supra note 67, at 1693 n.43. This, of course, conflicts with the Supreme Court’s
precedent in Abbott Laboratories, recognizing a presumption in favor of judicial review
for final agency actions. Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967).
74. See, e.g., Silver v. IRS, No. 19-cv-247, 2019 WL 7168625, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 24,
2019).
75. Compare id. (“Plaintiffs do not seek a refund or to impede revenue collection.
Instead, they challenge the IRS’s adopting of regulations without conducting statutorily mandated reviews . . . . The Anti-Injunction Act therefore presents no barrier to
Plaintiffs’ claims.”), and Hickman & Kerska, supra note 67, at 1765 (“[T]he courts can
restore the AIA to its original scope and purpose of facilitating IRS enforcement efforts
while also serving the APA’s intended function of checking government overreach.”),
with Bryan Camp, More on the Successful Challenge to the Anti-Inversion Regulations,
PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Oct. 2, 2017), https://procedurallytaxing.com/more-on-the
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determining whether or not the AIA does, in fact, bar administrative
claims to the Treasury.76 Even if the Supreme Court does hold that the
AIA mostly or even fully bars APA pre-enforcement challenges to the
Treasury, the standing question posed by this Note will still remain
important.77
2. The Justiciability Doctrine of Standing
The doctrine of standing has evolved considerably throughout
the last century, especially over the last three decades, into a confusing set of often inconsistent standards. Standing derives from Article
III of the Constitution, which vests “judicial power” in the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts extending over all “cases” and “controversies.”78 Although the Constitution does not define “cases” or “controversies,” constitutional jurisprudence interprets these terms to
“impose a constellation of constraints known collectively as doctrines
of justiciability.”79 These threshold requirements to judicial review
-successful-challenge-to-the-anti-inversion-regulations [https://perma.cc/DND3
-PFCW] (“This is exactly the kind of suit that the Anti-Injunction Act is supposed to
stop.”), and Fla. Bankers Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, 799 F.3d 1065, 1067 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (“The question before us is straightforward: Is a challenge to a tax-related
statutory or regulatory requirement that is enforced by a ‘penalty’—as opposed to a
challenge to a statute or regulation that imposes a tax—covered by the Anti-Injunction
Act . . . ? [T]he [AIA] bars this suit as premature.”).
76. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text.
77. Now that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to CIC Services, it may very
well answer this question. CIC Servs., LLC v. IRS, 925 F.3d 247, 259 (6th Cir. 2019), cert.
granted, 140 S. Ct. 2737 (2020) (mem.). And even if the Supreme Court does hold that
the AIA unequivocally bars APA challenges to the Treasury, the question posed by this
Note will remain relevant. In the recent case of Bullock, for example, the Department
of Justice did not raise an AIA challenge—instead arguing for dismissal on the basis of
lack of standing. Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1155–59 (D. Mont. 2019). It
seems rather unlikely that the Court would pronounce such a broad ruling, considering
the Court’s strongly worded pro-administrative language in Mayo Foundation. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
And if, on the other hand, the Supreme Court holds that the AIA does permit all or
most pre-enforcement APA challenges to the Treasury, then the standing question
posed by this Note will need to be urgently addressed by the courts. See Kerska, supra
note 59, at 74 (“The Supreme Court has said that no litigant should have to choose between asserting his rights and risking prosecution. That is precisely what the AIA now
requires for those who wish to challenge reporting regulations. . . . CIC Services offers
the perfect opportunity to end this unjustified ‘approach to administrative review
good for tax law only.’” (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States,
562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011))).
78. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2.
79. Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 78 (2007) (noting that “the riddle of justiciability[] is that the constraints the Supreme Court has read
into Article III . . . do not serve any apparent purpose”); see also Lee A. Albert,
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include, for example, the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, political
question, and standing.80
Standing doctrine in particular has received extended recent attention by the judiciary, with the Supreme Court issuing a number of
landmark cases within the last three decades. The premise of standing
requires a plaintiff to show that they have some actual personal stake
or injury in the lawsuit.81 Justice Antonin Scalia pithily described the
question of standing as: “What’s it to you?”82
To establish standing, a plaintiff must satisfy three requirements.83 The plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that they suffered an
Justiciability and Theories of Judicial Review: A Remote Relationship, 50 S. CAL. L. REV.
1139, 1139 (1977) (“[Justiciability] constitute[s] a method of formulating and resolving questions of actionability or entitlement to relief.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified
Approach to Justiciability, 22 CONN. L. REV. 677, 677 (1990) (“The entire area of justiciability is a morass that confuses more than it clarifies.”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Linkage Between Justiciability and Remedies—and Their Connection to Substantive Rights,
92 VA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2006) (“According to the Remedial Influences on Justiciability
Thesis [proposed by Fallon], when the Supreme Court feels apprehensions about the
availability or non-availability of remedies, it sometimes responds by adjusting applicable justiciability rules . . . .”).
80. E.g., Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 (1967) (ripeness) (“[The]
basic rationale is to prevent the courts . . . from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies . . . .”); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316
(1974) (mootness) (“[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” (quoting North Carolina v.
Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971))); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209–33 (1962) (political
question) (finding voting apportionment cases justiciable notwithstanding the political question doctrine); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (standing)
(“That question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury
suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an
act.”).
81. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 59 CASE W. RSRV.
L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2009).
82. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 882 (1983).
Notably, the Constitution omits any mention of the word “standing”; nor does it
contain any requirement that a plaintiff have some sort of “personal stake” in the litigation. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 168–69 (1992). The theory of standing, then, is one of
significant constitutional interpretation rather than a mandate of express constitutional text. Id. See generally id. at 169–97 (detailing the history and evolution of the
standing doctrine).
83. This standing analysis omits discussion of the zone-of-interests component of
standing. Zone-of-interests standing is statutory standing and not relevant to this Note.
See Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209
(2012). Zone-of-interests standing is generally not relevant to the tax context.
Additionally, this Note will not address the theory of taxpayer standing based on
the person’s status as a taxpayer. See, e.g., John J. Egan, II, Analyzing Taxpayer Standing
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injury-in-fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the complaint; and (3) that their grievance is redressable by the courts.84 The
injury-in-fact requirement—a tricky element for pre-enforcement administrative claims85—must be both “concrete and particularized”
and “actual or imminent,” as opposed to merely “conjectural or hypothetical.”86
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized iterations of this
same injury-in-fact test, requiring that a plaintiff demonstrate a “personal stake” in the controversy that compels a “real need to exercise
the power of judicial review in order to protect . . . the complaining
party.”87 The Supreme Court has also articulated that a vague, abstracted future injury is insufficient to establish the “imminence” of an
injury-in-fact, requiring instead that such a future injury be “certainly
impending.”88 The other elements of standing require the plaintiff to
show a causal connection that must be “fairly traceable to the
in Terms of General Standing Principles: The Road Not Taken, 63 B.U. L. REV. 717, 729–
30 (1983). While it might be easy to confuse the doctrine of taxpayer standing with
pre-enforcement APA standing against tax agencies, they are wholly unrelated doctrines. These taxpayer standing claims usually revolve around taxpayers challenging
government policies that a given taxpayer dislikes and are virtually always nonjusticiable. See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 49, at 1175 n.104 (citing Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559, 2563 (2006); and then citing Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482–
83 (1982), among others). While a taxpayer-standing claim will occasionally target an
IRS action, taxpayer standing cases are unrelated to tax law and the APA. See id.; see
also, e.g., Bartley v. United States, 123 F.3d 466, 469 (7th Cir. 1997) (denying standing
to taxpayer who argued general IRS overcollection and misuse of taxes).
Note also that prudential standing comes into play in these generalized grievances. See Kristin E. Hickman, How Did We Get Here Anyway?: Considering the Standing
Question in DaimlerChrysler v. Cuno, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 48 (2006) [hereinafter
Hickman, How Did We Get Here]. Prudential standing acts as an additional limit on
plaintiffs’ ability to establish justiciability; prudential standing relates to “judicially
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.
737, 751 (1984). It is thus irrelevant to the pre-enforcement standing inquiry central
to this Note.
84. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
85. See Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural Injury Standing After Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 275, 283–84 (1995) (“Unless a plaintiff can identify a concrete harm, establishing that he ‘himself [has] suffered an injury,’ the plaintiff
has not proven injury in fact, and must instead work through the political process if he
is to vindicate this interest.” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 578)).
86. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975); and then quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974)).
88. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013) (citing Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
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challenged action of the defendant”89 and that the court must be able
to provide redress that is “likely, as opposed to merely speculative.”90
Two elements of the standing requirements are particularly
problematic for plaintiffs challenging procedurally deficient pre-enforcement administrative actions. First, depending on how the judiciary interprets the injury-in-fact requirement, plaintiffs can struggle to
show that they have actually suffered an injury-in-fact. By definition,
pre-enforcement administrative actions do not presently injure or affect a party but rather institute a rule or regulation that will impact a
party down the line. If a court interprets the injury-in-fact requirement to mean that a plaintiff has “actually” been injured, then plaintiffs will struggle to show that such administrative actions with future
impacts constitute present injuries-in-fact.
Second, and relatedly, plaintiffs challenging pre-enforcement administrative actions can fail to satisfy the redressability requirement
of standing. A court could determine that addressing the agency’s action would, in fact, be purely speculative, rather than likely, for redressability purposes.91 Because no harmful action has yet been taken,
there is nothing for a court to redress. Nor is there any certainty that
any such redress would actually remedy the injury because the agency
could simply renew its rule or regulation under proper procedures.
While such a renewal would potentially fail during notice-and-comment proceedings, failure or other redress would not be guaranteed.
The Supreme Court emphasizes that standing is not a mere
“pleading requirement[] but rather an indispensable part of plaintiff’s
case.”92 Thus, all plaintiffs must establish standing in order to bring
their suit in court. If a plaintiff lacks standing, his or her suit will be
dismissed, even if a court finds that the plaintiff lacks standing well
into litigation.93
Judges and scholars cite to a variety of theories to justify the
standing doctrine. These justifications include the theory that standing ensures that the courts evaluate concrete lawsuits rooted in “an

89. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180
(2000).
90. Id. at 181.
91. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
92. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); see also Spokeo, Inc. v.
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–48 (2016) (holding that even when Congress elevates a
given harm, it cannot erase the personal injury standing requirement).
93. See, e.g., DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006) (dismissing
plaintiff’s lawsuit for lack of standing after being adjudicated on the merits by both the
district and appeals courts); see also Hickman, How Did We Get Here, supra note 83.
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actual factual setting” as opposed to hypothetical or remote claims.94
Relatedly, some argue that standing guarantees that parties are sufficiently adverse and ensures the possibility of judicial resolution and
remedy.95 Another especially prevalent explanation—one extolled by
the late Justice Scalia—argues that standing promotes the separation
of powers principle among the three branches of government.96
Some scholars have challenged that Article III of the Constitution
mandates any standing requirement at all, positing that standing is
nothing more than “a judicial construct, pure and simple.”97 Others
fear that utilizing the cryptic and archaic concept of standing as a
harsh gatekeeper to the courts undermines fairness, justice, and an
opportunity to be heard.98 Even amongst judges and Justices who do
endorse the constitutionally mandated nature of standing, their standing analyses can and do vary widely.99 This disparate conception of
94. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
95. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968) (“[T]he question of standing is related
only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary
context and in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.”). Contra
Scalia, supra note 82, at 892 (“Nor is it true, as Flast suggests, that the doctrine of standing cannot possibly have any bearing upon the allocation of power among the
branches . . . .”).
96. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 820 (1997) (“[T]he law of Art. III standing is built
on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.” (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at
752 (1984))); see Scalia, supra note 82, at 894 (“There is, I think, a functional relationship [between standing and separation of powers], which can best be described by
saying that the law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority,
and excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other
two branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself.”). For
an extended analysis of Justice Scalia’s conception of separation of powers and standing, see Sunstein, supra note 82, at 215–20. But cf. F. Andrew Hessick, The Separationof-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2017) (arguing that some cases
should be exempted from the standing requirement because they fail to implicate separation of powers concerns).
97. Raoul Berger, Standing To Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 818 (1969).
98. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 755–56 (1972) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Must our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible that we
render ourselves helpless when the existing methods and the traditional concepts do
not quite fit and do not prove to be entirely adequate for new issues?”); Flast, 392 U.S.
at 129 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“To describe those rights and interests as personal, and
to intimate that they are in some unspecified fashion to be differentiated from those of
the general public, reduces constitutional standing to a word game played by secret
rules.” (emphasis added)).
99. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 508 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The law of standing does not require the latter kind of specificity. How could
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standing has led administrative scholars to declare that standing jurisprudence is a “maze of often inconsistent statements.”100
This is especially true for pre-enforcement administrative litigation, where courts apply wildly inconsistent standing analyses, sometimes applying ordinary standing analysis and other times applying
the relaxed procedural standing analysis.101
3. Procedural Standing
While the APA expressly provides judicial review to plaintiffs
challenging administratively violative agency actions,102 there is often
a question of whether and when an administrative procedural injury
is sufficient to constitute an injury-in-fact as required by the standing
doctrine.103
The standing elements of imminence and redressability are theoretically much more challenging for plaintiffs in procedural actions.
Can a plaintiff really prove that his purported injury would be fully
redressed by forcing agencies to re-do their regulating process?104 Can
a plaintiff really demonstrate that a mere failure to follow proper
it?”); Am. Bottom Conservancy v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 650 F.3d 652, 655–56 (7th
Cir. 2011); Bradford C. Mank, Judge Posner’s Practical Theory of Standing: Closer to Justice Breyer’s Approach to Standing than Justice Scalia’s, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 71, 89–103,
115–20 (2012) (noting that both Justice Breyer and Judge Posner have more “pragmatic” (although not identical) approaches to standing); see also Clifford M. Gerber,
Note, Standing To Challenge Internal Revenue Service Decisionmaking: The Need for a
Better Rationale, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1041, 1050 n.61 (1978) (“[T]he court in SCRAP accepted the smallest degree of injury as sufficient to support a claim of standing.” (citing
United States v. Students Challenging Regul. Agency Procs., 412 U.S. 669, 689 n.14
(1973))).
100. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 41, at 919. These inconsistencies in standing jurisprudence often derive from conflicting political ideologies amongst the Justices—
for much of the last three decades the Supreme Court split 4-4 over standing issues
with Chief Justice Roberts acting as the deciding vote.
Scholars contend, for example, in the case of Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
518 (2007), that Chief Justice Roberts compelled the majority to accept his language
granting states superior standing claims. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 41, at 966.
The question, then, is how much of contemporary standing jurisprudence starts and
stops exclusively with the swing vote of Chief Justice Roberts. See id.
101. See infra Part II.A.
102. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action . . . is
entitled to judicial review thereof.”).
103. See, e.g., supra Part I.B.2.
104. See Burt, supra note 85, at 275–76 (“[S]ince the agency might have reached
the same result even if it had followed the correct procedure. . . . procedural plaintiffs
are never able to show that adherence to procedure will definitely avert subsequent
harm, [thus] they are always unable to meet the redressability requirement of standing.”).
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procedure causes him imminent harm?105 Under standing jurisprudence, however, procedural injuries are “special.”106 Courts have long
assessed procedural claims based on whether the agency’s actions
could plausibly cause the plaintiff future harm.107 The Supreme
“Court’s acknowledgment that procedural injuries are ‘special’ for
standing purposes was no more than belated recognition of a reality
that should have been obvious to any student of administrative
law.”108
“A procedural injury occurs when an agency fails to follow a legally required procedure,” such as the APA, “and this failure increases
the risk of future harm to some party.”109 The principle behind this
procedural theory of standing is that litigants who are procedurally
impaired are “special” in the sense that ignoring their procedural
rights could lead to injury, even though they have not yet been injured.110 Indeed, Justice Scalia, a prominent promoter of the importance of standing,111 explicitly noted this procedural exception to
traditional standing rules in the seminal case of Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, stating that “‘procedural rights’ are special: The person who
has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete interests
can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy.”112
Justice Scalia provided an illustration of such a procedurally special injury. Imagining a hypothetical “construction of a federally licensed dam” where the adjacent neighbor challenges the dam because
of “the licensing agency’s failure to prepare an environmental impact
statement,”113 Justice Scalia expressly found that “even though the
dam will not be completed for many years”—and thus the plaintiff
could not meet the traditional standing requirements of imminence
105. See id. at 281 (“Procedural plaintiffs will necessarily have difficulty showing
imminence because the ultimate substantive harm they seek to prevent will occur, if
at all, at some time in the future.”).
106. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (“There is this much
truth to the assertion that ‘procedural rights’ are special . . . .”).
107. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Making Sense of Procedural Injury, 62 ADMIN. L. REV.
1, 2 (2010) (“In thousands of cases, courts have routinely decided whether an agency
erred by refusing to grant . . . required procedure, e.g., a hearing without requiring the
petitioner to demonstrate that the agency certainly, or even probably, would have
reached a different result if it had granted the [procedure].”).
108. Id.
109. Burt, supra note 85, at 276.
110. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
111. See, e.g., supra note 96 and accompanying text.
112. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
113. Id.
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and redressability—the neighbor-plaintiff would have standing because of the special relaxed standing rules for procedural injuries.114
Courts regularly, but not always, analyze procedural claims under these relaxed standards. For example, many courts apply an “easyto-meet plausibility test in determining whether an alleged deprivation of a procedural right qualifies as a procedural injury sufficient to
support a grant of standing.”115 This test relates to redressability,
simply asking whether the agency’s faulty process plausibly, rather
than definitely, harmed the plaintiff.116 Alternatively, a minority of
courts apply a probability test, where a plaintiff must demonstrate
that he or she was probably injured by the agency’s faulty process.117
Scholars have noted the flaws inherent in a more stringent probability
test which, like the application of traditional standing doctrine to procedural injuries, virtually guarantees that petitioner will fail to establish standing.118
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s directive in Lujan, courts are far
from unanimous in applying special procedural standing analysis.119
Some courts have flatly disagreed with the Lujan proposition that procedural plaintiffs are special with respect to the standing inquiry.120
Environmental plaintiffs asserting procedural lawsuits have fared
114. Id.
115. Pierce, supra note 107, at 8.
116. See id. at 2–3 (“[A] petitioner prevails by alleging only unlawful deprivation
of a procedural right that might plausibly have changed the outcome of a substantive
dispute.”).
117. See, e.g., Ctr. for L. & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1159 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (“[A] procedural-rights plaintiff must demonstrate standing by ‘show[ing] . . .
that it is substantially probable that the procedural breach will cause the essential injury to the plaintiff’s own interest.’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Fla. Audubon Soc’y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 664–65 (D.C. Cir. 1996))).
118. See Pierce, supra note 107, at 12 (“Because the probability test will almost
always yield a holding that a petitioner lacks standing, [that] method of applying the
procedural injury test has the potential to eliminate de facto the procedural standing
doctrine . . . .”).
119. See, e.g., Burt, supra note 85, at 277 & n.7 (discussing the “different methods
[used] to assess standing in procedural injury cases”).
120. See, e.g., Coastal Habitat All. v. Patterson, 601 F. Supp. 2d 868, 880 n.15 (W.D.
Tex. 2008) (“Lujan’s footnote seven cites no cases . . . . The Alliance asks Lujan’s footnote seven to carry more weight here than is warranted . . . .”); Nulankeyutmonen
Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 462 F. Supp. 2d 86, 99 (D. Me. 2006) (discussing Lujan and
finding that the Court “specifically rejected” the proposition “that ‘the Government’s
violation of a certain (undescribed) class of procedural duty satisfies the concrete-injury requirement by itself’” (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573 n.8
(1992))); see also Burt, supra note 85, at 285 (arguing that special rights for procedural
injuries undercuts Lujan’s main holding—“eviscerat[ing] the standing requirements of
the Constitution”).
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somewhat better in receiving the relaxed procedural standing doctrine.121 While pre-enforcement APA challenges against the Treasury
have not historically enjoyed special procedural standing rights,122 recent pre-enforcement tax-administrative cases have begun analyzing
plaintiffs’ standing with the lenient procedural standing rights theory.123 With extremely limited precedent, it remains to be seen
whether other courts embrace or reject the special standing status of
procedurally injured plaintiffs in the pre-enforcement tax-administrative context.
In sum, the Treasury has historically been immune from ordinary
pre-enforcement administrative law challenges under the AIA, but
that immunity appears to be changing. Courts are now inconsistently
providing plaintiffs a pathway to litigate pre-enforcement administrative procedural claims against the Treasury, but these plaintiffs must
still establish standing. Whether plaintiffs have standing to sue in
these pre-enforcement administrative claims often turns on whether
the court analyzes plaintiffs’ claims under ordinary or procedural
standing analyses. While Justice Scalia indicated in Lujan that plaintiffs’ standing should be assessed under procedural standing analysis,
few courts employ the procedural standing inquiry.
II. EMERGING JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT ON PRE-ENFORCEMENT APA
STANDING SUITS AGAINST THE TREASURY
Historically, under tax exceptionalism, plaintiffs struggled to secure standing, with a small but growing set of jurisdictions weighing
in on pre-enforcement APA claims against the Treasury. These courts’
decisions are inconsistent with one another and reflect an emerging
and problematic jurisdictional split. This split, if it continues
121. Compare Wash. Env’t Council v. Bellon, 741 F.3d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 2014)
(denying rehearing en banc and rejecting arguments that Massachusetts v. EPA grants
non-state entities relaxed standing for procedural injuries), with id. at 1080 (Gould, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that “Massachusetts v. EPA also confers standing upon individuals
seeking to induce state action to protect the environment”), WildEarth Guardians v.
Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (granting relaxed standing requirements for
procedural injuries), and Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. EPA, 861 F.3d 174, 182 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (“In a case alleging a procedural injury, we ‘relax the redressability and imminence requirements’ of standing.” (quoting WildEarth, 738 F.3d at 305)).
122. Again, from a very limited sample size. See supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
123. See, e.g., Silver v. IRS, No. 19-CV-247, 2019 WL 7168625, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 24,
2019) (“In [procedural injury] cases, the redressability and imminence requirements
of standing are relaxed.” (citing WildEarth, 738 F.3d at 305)). But cf. Bullock v. IRS, 401
F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1155–59 (D. Mont. 2019) (omitting mention of the procedural standing doctrine in a discussion of failure to observe APA-mandated procedure).
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unabated, undermines core judicial values, including the principles
that every right has a remedy, that “global” doctrines are treated uniformly,124 that persons can challenge their liability stemming from
agency decisions without being forced to break the law or incurring
civil or criminal liability, and that like persons be treated alike. This
emerging jurisdictional split over whether plaintiffs have standing to
challenge pre-enforcement APA violations against the Treasury creates a number of serious problems that must be promptly addressed.
This Part documents examples of inconsistent judicial application of standing in the pre-enforcement APA tax agency context as well
as policy tensions between the doctrines of traditional standing, procedural standing, and tax exceptionalism. Section A analyzes two recent cases—Bullock and Silver—that evince the emergence of a jurisdictional split over standing in pre-enforcement APA suits against the
Treasury. Section B charts the numerous policy problems inherent in
the courts’ current use (or lack thereof) of the procedural standing
doctrine.
A. EMERGING JURISDICTIONAL SPLIT
Recent cases analyzing standing evince an emerging jurisdictional split in pre-enforcement APA suits against the Treasury. While
courts are increasingly granting plaintiffs standing to initiate such administrative suits against the Treasury, the courts’ analyses are highly
inconsistent. These courts analyze the standing inquiry disparately,
differing on whether to apply the ordinary standing doctrine or the
procedural standing doctrine.
This Section explores this emerging jurisdictional split over preenforcement APA standing in tax cases. Subsection 1 explores courts’
historically restrictive standing analyses for tax cases. Subsection 2
documents the recent Bullock v. IRS and Silver v. IRS decisions. In both
cases the court granted plaintiffs standing. However, in finding that
plaintiffs had standing, the two courts engaged in divergent standing
analyses. Subsection 3 contextualizes these cases and explains how
they demonstrate an emerging jurisdictional split.

124. E.g., that a doctrine, especially a constitutionally derived doctrine such as
standing, should be applied consistently across jurisdictions.
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1. Historical Denial of APA Standing to Pre-Enforcement Tax APA
Challenges
Historically, the AIA effectively barred APA pre-enforcement
challenges to the Treasury;125 few courts (and few scholars) have addressed justiciability challenges, like standing, to such administrative
claims.126 However, several courts did analyze pre-enforcement APA
challengers’ claims of standing in actions against the Treasury. Of the
few early decisions to analyze such claimants’ standing, courts’ analyses were strict and summarily denied plaintiffs’ standing.127
In Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, for example, indigent rights organizations attempted to invalidate an IRS
revenue ruling that reduced the requirement for tax-exempt hospitals
to offer emergency care to those unable to pay for violating noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures under the APA.128 Instead of relying on the AIA, the Eastern Kentucky court held that plaintiffs lacked
standing, primarily due to the court’s inability to redress plaintiffs’ alleged harms.129
Justice Stewart concurred in Eastern Kentucky, writing: “I cannot
now imagine a case . . . where a person whose own tax liability was not
affected ever could have standing to litigate the federal tax liability of
someone else.”130 This combination of resistance to standing and the

125. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
126. E.g., Stephanie H. McMahon, Pre-Enforcement Litigation Needed for Taxing
Procedures, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1317, 1353 (2017) (“[F]ew studies focus on justiciability
and taxation because of the limited number of tax standing cases.”). For a list of scholars analyzing standing vis-à-vis tax APA challenges, see Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Standing To Sue About Taxes, TAX NOTES FED., July 1, 2019, at 45, 46 n.5, which collects articles. Note that only some of these articles deal with standing specifically in relation to
APA tax applications. For a short list of cases hitting the “sweet spot” where plaintiffs
avoided the AIA and were found to have standing, see Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Standing
To Sue About Taxes, Part 2, TAX NOTES FED., July 15, 2019, at 323, 327–30 [hereinafter
Cummings, Standing To Sue, Part 2] (attempting “to cite all of the relatively few court
decisions” meeting those criteria).
127. See Tax Analysts & Advocs. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 130, 134 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(“Appellants . . . seek[] a declaratory judgment that certain published and private rulings of the [IRS] . . . are contrary to the [I.R.C.] and therefore unlawful. . . . We . . . conclude that both appellants lack standing as federal taxpayers . . . .”); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 28 (1976) (“[Plaintiffs] asserted that the [IRS] violated the
Internal Revenue Code . . . and the [APA] by issuing a Revenue Ruling . . . . We conclude
that these plaintiffs lack standing to bring this suit.”).
128. E. Ky. Welfare, 426 U.S. at 32–34.
129. Id. at 42–43, 42 n.23.
130. Id. at 46 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The D.C. Circuit similarly
noted the difficulty of establishing standing, stating that “[i]t is well-recognized that
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AIA historically “reduce[d] judicial review through a two-step sieve. If
litigation is not stopped by one, it is stopped by the other.”131
The bulk of these cases denying standing for pre-enforcement
APA challenges to the Treasury, however, occurred before Lujan,
which concluded that plaintiffs who suffered procedural injuries
should enjoy a relaxed standing analysis.132 Moreover, the judiciary’s
approach to pre-enforcement administrative justiciability matters has
fluctuated since the Supreme Court’s 2011 Mayo decision.133 PostMayo, plaintiffs have increasingly challenged and prevailed against
the Treasury in pre-enforcement APA actions, including establishing
standing.134
Notwithstanding the courts’ newfound willingness to apply administrative law to the Treasury, pre-enforcement APA tax justiciability jurisprudence is littered with inconsistencies.135 The standing doctrine, in particular, has been sparsely and inconsistently analyzed by
the courts in this context,136 with the doctrine of procedural standing
receiving even more inconsistent and sporadic attention.137
Some scholars argue that the judiciary’s prior zealous and strict
standing jurisprudence for pre-enforcement tax APA challenges stems
from tax exceptionalism.138 “[T]he Court’s tax-exceptionalist focus on

the standing inquiry in tax cases is more restrictive than in other cases.” Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
131. McMahon, supra note 126, at 1358.
132. See supra Part I.B.3.
133. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011)
(“Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less deferential standard of
review to Treasury Department regulations . . . . [W]e are not inclined to carve out an
approach to administrative review good for tax law only.”).
134. Indeed, since Mayo no court has found any Treasury regulation to be interpretative rather than substantive. See Sapirie, supra note 65, at 995 (citing Professor
Kristin E. Hickman).
135. As noted in Part I.B.1, courts and scholars are currently focused on examining
the extent of the AIA with respect to APA pre-enforcement challenges. See supra Part
I.B.1. While a Supreme Court ruling that the AIA fully bars pre-enforcement APA challenges—an unlikely result—would obviate this standing inquiry, the two analyses are
wholly separate. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Cummings, Standing To Sue, Part 2, supra note 126, at 327–28 (noting
the “relatively few court decisions . . . finding that plaintiffs were in the sweet spot of
avoiding the AIA and having standing” as well as cases where standing was “so obvious” that the court did not even analyze standing).
137. See supra notes 119–23 and accompanying text.
138. See Lynn D. Lu, Standing in the Shadow of Tax Exceptionalism: Expanding Access to Judicial Review of Federal Agency Rules, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 73, 128 (2014) (arguing that tax exceptionalism implicitly drove the Eastern Kentucky and Wright Courts to
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revenue collection and, relatedly, on individual agency actions to enforce taxpayer compliance, effectively insulated the agency from general administrative law principles supporting judicial review.”139
The courts’ historical harsh standing analysis and myriad inconsistencies in standing analysis for pre-enforcement APA challenges to
the Treasury leave plaintiffs, the Treasury, and taxpayers seeking certainty over their taxes left in the lurch. Current jurisprudence is unclear whether and when plaintiffs will meet the justiciability thresholds to successfully make pre-enforcement APA challenges against the
Treasury. All parties stand to suffer from this uncertainty.
2. Post-Mayo Standing Jurisprudence
Recently, courts have continued their apparent rejection of taxexceptionalism by granting plaintiffs suing the Treasury standing to
launch pre-enforcement APA actions. Two cases highlight courts’ recent deviation from their historically harsh standing analyses. Yet
these cases also demonstrate that these courts’ approaches to standing are far from uniform. Subsection a explores the recent Bullock v.
IRS ruling, with its emphasis on states’ special standing rights via Massachusetts v. EPA. Subsection b assesses the recent case of Silver v. IRS,
which utilizes the procedural standing doctrine to grant the plaintiff
standing to challenge the Treasury’s administrative actions.
a. Bullock v. IRS
In Bullock v. IRS, Montana and New Jersey challenged the IRS’s
decision to rescind a regulation that required 503(c)(4) “social welfare organizations” to report charitable contributions,140 allowing
“dark money” to flow unreported to these nonprofits.141 The District
of Montana nullified the IRS’s new revenue procedure, holding that

deny taxpayers’ standing); see also id. at 112 (“[I]t is far from clear why the IRC, in
particular, should be interpreted to foreclose such standing.”).
139. Id. at 128.
140. Rev. Proc. 2018-38 (eliminating the charitable reporting requirement found
in Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2).
141. Complaint at 8–9, Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (D. Mont. 2019) (No.
18-CV-00103) (“The names and addresses of significant contributors . . . play a significant role in ferreting out other nefarious activity . . . . [C]ampaign spending by ‘dark
money’ groups—primarily, organizations that are tax-exempt . . . increased more than
fifty-fold between 2004 and 2016.”).
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the promulgation was an invalid attempt to “evade the time-consuming procedures of the APA.”142
Under Code section 6033(a)(1), nonprofits143 must file a Form
990 tax return stating “information for the purpose of carrying out the
internal revenue laws as the . . . regulations prescribe.”144 In 1969,
Congress additionally codified that, for 501(c)(3) charitable nonprofits, their 990s must include “the names and addresses of all substantial contributors.”145 The following year, the Treasury issued regulations extending the substantial contributor filing requirement to other
noncharitable tax exempt entities (beyond just 501(c)(3) organizations).146 Thus, under the Treasury’s regulations, 501(c)(4) “social
welfare” organizations, which include “politically active groups like
the Koch brothers-backed Americans for Prosperity,” must report all
substantial contributors on their Form 990.147
In 2018, the IRS issued Revenue Procedure 2018-38, reversing
this regulation by instructing that “tax-exempt organizations required
to file the Form 990 . . . other than those described in 501(c)(3), will
no longer be required to provide names and addresses of contributors.”148 The IRS stated that it “does not need personally identifiable
information of donors . . . to carry out its responsibilities.”149
Critics, however, decried this new rule as enabling “dark money
groups to hide the identities of donors from state regulators and the
142. Bullock, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 1159 (quoting Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d
1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Sapirie, supra note 65, at 994 (summarizing Bullock).
143. Or “every organization exempt from taxation under section 501(a).” I.R.C.
§ 6033(a)(1).
144. Id.
145. Id. § 6033(b)(5). “Substantial contributor” is defined as a donor who gave
more than $5,000 to the organization in a tax year. Id. § 507(d)(2)(A).
146. Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(a)(2)(ii)(f) (2020) (“The information generally required to be furnished by an organization exempt under section 501(a) is . . . . the
names and addresses of all persons who contributed, bequeathed, or devised $5,000
or more (in money or other property) during the taxable year.”); see also Rev. Proc.
2018-38 § 2, 2018-31 I.R.B. 280 (summarizing pre-2018 I.R.C. § 6033(a) reporting requirements).
147. Daniel Hemel, Bullock v. IRS and the Future of Tax Administrative Law (Part I),
TAXPROF BLOG (Aug. 20, 2019), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2019/08/
hemel-bullock-v-irs-and-the-future-of-tax-administrative-law-part-i.html [https://
perma.cc/WYE8-YCYC].
148. Rev. Proc. 2018-38 § 3, 2018-31 I.R.B. 280.
149. Id. The new policy continued, stating that “[t]he requirement to report such
information increases compliance costs for some private parties, consumes IRS resources in connection with the redaction of such information, and poses a risk of inadvertent disclosure of information that is not open to public inspection.” Id.
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public.”150 Some commentators vocalized specific concerns that the
Trump administration initiated this new policy in response to heavy
lobbying from the Koch brothers.151 Notwithstanding the effect of this
regulation-reversal, critics argued that the new revenue procedure
was invalid for violating the APA. Specifically, the states of Montana
and New Jersey sued the Treasury, alleging that the tax agency
wrongly circumvented notice-and-comment procedures on what constituted a legislative, rather than procedural, rule.152
In response to the plaintiff-states’ complaint, the IRS moved to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) while the plaintiffs simultaneously
moved for summary judgment.153 The IRS’s primary argument for dismissing Montana’s and New Jersey’s suits was that they lacked standing.154 Specifically, the IRS argued that “Plaintiffs possess[ed] no legally protected interest in receiving donor information from the IRS
and thus . . . suffered no actual harm caused by Revenue Procedure

150. Eric Dietrich, Bullock Notches a Win Against IRS in Dark Money Lawsuit, MONT.
FREE PRESS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://montanafreepress.org/2019/08/01/bullock
-notches-a-win-against-irs-in-dark-money-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/98S9-32U5];
see also Patricia Cohen, Kenneth P. Vogel & Jim Tankersley, I.R.S. Will No Longer Force
Kochs and Other Groups to Disclose Donors, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2018), https://www
.nytimes.com/2018/07/17/us/politics/irs-will-no-longer-force-kochs-and-other
-groups-to-disclose-donors.html [https://perma.cc/3Z7H-K5UM] (“The change,
which has long been sought by conservatives and Republicans in Congress, will affect . . . groups as varied as arms of the AARP, the United States Chamber of Commerce,
the National Rifle Association and Americans for Prosperity . . . .”).
151. See Daniel Hemel, Montana Vs. the Koch Brothers, SLATE (July 24, 2018, 5:51
PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/07/montana-is-taking-on-the
-trump-administration-and-the-koch-brothers-in-a-new-lawsuit.html [https://perma
.cc/N9QZ-H92C] (“[W]hy did the IRS act so hastily to eviscerate a rule that had applied . . . for nearly a half-century? For one thing, it faced heavy pressure from . . . [t]he
Koch brothers’ Americans for Prosperity group . . . .”); Cohen et al., supra note 150
(“‘Transparency is meant for the government, not for private individuals,’ said Philip
Ellender, the head lobbyist for Koch Industries . . . . [which] began lobbying the White
House on the issue after President Trump’s election, according to lobbying filings.”).
152. Complaint, supra note 141, at 19–21 (“Before a substantive rule like Revenue
Procedure 2018-38 may take effect, the APA requires the agency to issue a notice of
proposed rulemaking . . . . Defendants did not comply with this notice-and-comment
requirement . . . .”). The complaint additionally argued that Rev. Proc. 2018-38 violated
the APA’s arbitrary and capricious requirement. Id. at 22–24 (“To comply with the APA,
an agency must supply a ‘reasoned analysis’ of its decision to amend a legislative
rule. . . . In promulgating Revenue Procedure 2018-38, Defendants did not supply a
reasoned analysis . . . .” (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983))).
153. Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1147–48 (D. Mont. 2019).
154. Id. at 1150 (“Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing.”).
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2018-38” and therefore lacked standing to challenge the revenue procedure.155
The states countered that, while ordinary citizens are not entitled
to see a nonprofit’s substantial contributor list, state officials can view
these lists for the purposes of administering the state’s tax laws.156
Thus, the states argued that the IRS’s policy reversal injured them by
obviating their ability to review substantial contributor information
for their own state tax purposes, thereby conferring them standing.157
The District of Montana held that “[t]he deprivation of information can rise to a level sufficient to establish an Article III injury for
the purposes of standing.”158 In order for information deprivation to
confer standing, a plaintiff must pass a two-part test: First, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that “the agency’s action or omission to act injured
the organization’s interest,” and second, that “the organization expended resources to counteract that harm.”159
The Bullock court found that both New Jersey and Montana had
standing to challenge the IRS, but for different reasons. The court determined that New Jersey easily passed the two-part test and established standing to sue the IRS. The court held that, given New Jersey’s
allegation “that it had relied on [substantial-contributor information]
information to ‘protect the public from fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation by charitable organizations operating in or raising money in the
State,’” “Revenue Procedure 2018-38 effectively . . . deprived New
155. Id.
156. Complaint, supra note 141, at 7 (“The disclosures . . . remain confidential from
the public, but are available . . . to state tax authorities including Montana, pursuant to
[I.R.C.] § 6103(d).”); I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (“Returns and return information . . . shall be
open to inspection by, or disclosure to, any State agency, body . . . charged under the
laws of such State with responsibility for the administration of State tax laws . . . .”).
Note that § 6103 is the same tax code section that “gives . . . the Ways and Means chairman, the right to request individual tax returns.” Aysha Bagchi, Here’s What You Should
Know as Trump Tax Return Battles Brew, BLOOMBERG TAX (Sept. 27, 2019, 3:46 AM),
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/heres-what-you-should-know-as
-trump-tax-return-battles-brew [https://perma.cc/Z6TV-KZH6].
157. Complaint, supra note 141, at 12–14 (arguing that the inability to request contributor information from the IRS “frustrates the efficient administration of Montana’s
tax laws” and “shoulder[s it] with additional financial and administrative burdens” as
a result of the resources required to devise and enforce new state tax procedures); see
also Hemel, supra note 151 (“According to the complaint, the state’s tax agency relies
on information collected by the IRS when making its own tax-exemption determinations . . . .”).
158. Bullock, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 1150–51 (citing Pub. Citizen v. Carlin, 2 F. Supp. 2d
1, 9 (D.D.C. 1997), rev’d on other grounds, 184 F.3d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
159. Id. at 1151 (quoting People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t
of Agric., 797 F.3d 1087, 1093–94 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
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Jersey of previously available information.”160 The court also found
that New Jersey “diverted state resources to create new regulatory
processes to obtain the previously available information collected by
the IRS.”161 Thus, the court concluded that New Jersey’s injury—stemming from Revenue Procedure 2018-38—was sufficient to establish
standing.162
The court acknowledged, however, that “Montana present[ed] a
closer case” than New Jersey because Montana did not allege that it
had incurred actual costs to counteract the harm from Revenue Procedure 2018-38.163 Instead Montana only alleged that “it will incur . . .
future economic impacts as a consequence.”164 The court sidestepped
this concern, citing Massachusetts v. EPA for the proposition that
“states do not come before the courts as ‘normal litigants’ . . . . [but as]
quasi-sovereign” entities.165 Thus, the court concluded that Revenue
Procedure 2018-38 injured Montana and that Montana’s special status as a state was sufficient to overcome its failure to expend resources to counteract the revenue procedure.166
After establishing that both New Jersey and Montana enjoyed
standing to challenge the IRS, the court held Revenue Procedure 201838 “a legislative rule, [that] requires the IRS to follow the notice-andcomment procedures pursuant to the APA.”167 Because the IRS failed
to follow the APA’s procedures, the court granted summary judgment
to the plaintiffs, voiding Revenue Procedure 2018-38 entirely and restoring the earlier donor disclosure regulations.168
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1152 (“New Jersey’s alleged efforts . . . rise to the level of an injury sufficient to meet the standard set by PETA for an informational injury.”).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007)). “The fact that
Montana relies substantially on the IRS’s own assessment of tax-exempt organizations
‘only reinforces the conclusion that its stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently
concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judicial power.’” Id. (quoting Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 520). For a discussion of Massachusetts v. EPA, see supra note 100.
166. Bullock, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 1152 (“Montana alleges a sufficient basis for standing in the form of having to incur future expenses under these circumstances . . . .”).
167. Id. at 1158 (citing Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 333 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir.
2003)).
168. Id. at 1159 (“IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment . . .
is GRANTED. This Court holds unlawful and will set aside Revenue Procedure 2018-38
as adopted by the IRS.”).
As a coda to this saga, the IRS reissued the same policy in Revenue Procedure
2018-38 as a regulation in the Federal Register under proper notice-and-comment
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The Bullock court thus chose to employ an ordinary standing
analysis to the plaintiff-states.169 After finding that New Jersey established ordinary standing, the Court struggled to determine whether
Montana should also have standing to sue the Treasury.170 Seeming to
find that Montana lacked an injury-in-fact, the Court turned to the precarious Massachusetts standing doctrine to grant Montana standing
anyway.171 Had the Bullock court simply utilized the procedural standing doctrine, it seems likely that it could have found Montana to have
had standing without Massachusetts v. EPA.172
b. Silver v. IRS
More recently, in Silver v. IRS, the District Court for the District of
Columbia allowed a plaintiff to challenge the regulations regarding the
transition tax that the IRS issued in response to the TCJA.173 The court
found that the plaintiff had standing to proceed over the justiciability
challenges of the IRS via the procedural standing doctrine.174
procedures. See Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements
of Exempt Organizations, 84 Fed. Reg. 47,447 (proposed Sept. 10, 2019) (to be codified
at Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2); Guidance Under Section 6033 Regarding the Reporting Requirements of Exempt Organizations, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,959 (May 28, 2020) (to be codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2). Thus, once again “social welfare organizations” including Americans for Prosperity will be able to avoid disclosing receipt of donor
contributions. As of March 2021, it is unclear whether another state or entity will challenge the IRS’s ability to promulgate such a rule.
169. See Bullock, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 1150 (invoking Article III standing rules from
Clapper and Lujan). Although this analysis also had to assess whether Plaintiffs were
injured via information deprivation. See id. at 1150–51 (discussing Public Citizen’s deprivation injury standard).
170. See id. at 1152 (“New Jersey’s alleged efforts . . . rise to the level of an injury
sufficient to meet the standard set by PETA . . . . Montana presents a closer case. . . .
[H]owever, [it] acts on behalf of its citizens.”).
171. Compare id. (“Montana has alleged ‘an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign’ . . . [It] alleges a sufficient basis for standing in the form of having to incur future
expenses under these circumstances . . . .” (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
518 (2007))), with supra note 100 (discussing the precarity of the Massachusetts v. EPA
theory of standing).
172. See infra Part III.B.1.
173. The Treasury regulations provide details for the TCJA’s alterations to international tax collection—specifically I.R.C. § 965. The transition tax is a one-time 15.5%
tax on U.S. shareholders of “controlled foreign corporations.” See 84 Fed. Reg. 1838
(Feb. 5, 2019) (codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.965-1 to -4); Ryan Finley, Suit Challenging
Transition Tax Regs Can Proceed to Merits, 166 TAX NOTES FED. 155, 155 (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/suit-challenging
-transition-tax-regs-can-proceed-merits/2020/01/06/2bqqp; Silver v. IRS, No. 19-cv247, 2019 WL 7168625 (D.D.C. Dec. 24, 2019).
174. Silver, 2019 WL 7168625, at *3.
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Domestic corporations are taxed on their world-wide income.175
However, prior to the TCJA, income that corporations earned indirectly from their foreign corporate subsidiaries was not taxed until
that income was distributed or “repatriated” to its domestic parent
corporation.176 This led to domestic corporations stockpiling cash
overseas, refusing to repatriate their foreign income in order to avoid
(or at least defer) U.S. taxation,177 of more than $2.6 trillion in untaxed,
offshore profits as of 2016.178
In response, the GOP’s TCJA attempted to force domestic corporations to repatriate their foreign income in exchange for a special tax
rate of 15.5% via a one time “transition tax.”179 The IRS enumerated
on various aspects of the TCJA’s transition tax180 in regulations issued
on February 5, 2019.181
The plaintiff in Silver—an American citizen with an Israeli legal
practice that would be subject to the transition tax—challenged the
regulations, arguing that the IRS failed to perform the small-business
impact evaluations required by the APA, including the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) and the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA)
175. See Sean P. McElroy, The Mandatory Repatriation Tax Is Unconstitutional, YALE
J. ON REGUL. BULL. (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/bulletin/the-mandatory
-repatriation-tax-is-unconstitutional-2 [https://perma.cc/BAN5-AR9G].
176. Id.; Henry Ordower, Abandoning Realization and the Transition Tax: Toward a
Comprehensive Tax Base, 67 BUFF. L. REV. 1371, 1376 (2019).
177. See J. Clifton Fleming Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay, Getting from Here
to There: The Transition Tax Issue, 154 TAX NOTES 69, 72–74 (2017).
178. Press Release, GOP House Ways & Means Comm., Brady, Neal Highlight Another Reason for Pro-Growth Tax Reform (Sept. 29, 2016), https://gop
-waysandmeans.house.gov/brady-neal-highlight-another-reason-pro-growth-tax
-reform [https://perma.cc/PK6C-U6CR] (quoting Letter from Thomas A. Barthold,
Chief of Staff, Joint Comm. on Tax’n, to the Hon. Kevin Brady & Hon. Richard Neal (Aug.
31, 2016)). Silicon Valley tech companies were particularly guilty of refusing to repatriate their offshore profits. See Tatyana Shumsky, Tax Overhaul Could End Record
Pileup of Offshore Cash, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tax
-overhaul-could-end-record-pileup-of-offshore-cash-1511203340 [https://perma.cc/
GDW2-CFQR].
179. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 14103(a) (2017) (amending I.R.C.
§ 965 to include the “transition tax”). Apple, for example, did agree to repatriate $252
billion in response to the transition tax. See Daisuke Wakabayashi & Brian X. Chen, Apple, Capitalizing on New Tax Law, Plans To Bring Billions in Cash Back to the U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/17/technology/apple-tax
-bill-repatriate-cash.html [https://perma.cc/33AN-48M9].
180. See, e.g., Final Transition Tax Regulations Provide Certainty for Taxpayers,
GRANT THORNTON (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.grantthornton.com/library/alerts/
tax/2019/Flash/final-transition-tax-regulations-provide-certainty-for-taxpayers
.aspx.
181. 84 Fed. Reg. 1838 (Feb. 5, 2019) (codified at Treas. Reg. § 1.965).
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requirements.182 The IRS moved to dismiss, arguing both that the
plaintiff lacked standing to sue and that his claim was barred by the
AIA.183 In an “unexpected” opinion,184 Judge Mehta of the D.C. District
Court found that the plaintiff had standing because he had suffered a
“straightforward injury” in the form of “recordkeeping obligations”
and compliance costs.185 Importantly, Judge Mehta held that, in the
case of procedural injuries, elements of the standing inquiry are “relaxed.”186
While experts note that this holding “is not going out on a limb,”
other recent courts that have held in favor of plaintiffs through a similar standing inquiry vis-à-vis pre-enforcement APA challenges to tax
agencies did not rely on the special procedural standing inquiry.187

182. See Andrew Velarde, Silver Strikes Gold for Taxpayer Administrative Law Challenges, 97 TAX NOTES INT’L 146, 146 (2020); 5 U.S.C. §§ 601, 603(a); 44 U.S.C. § 3506
(requiring reduced compliance burden for small businesses). Although the IRS “regularly fails to comply with the RFA requirements,” “circuit courts have not been especially receptive to these challenges.” Keith Fogg, How Does the Regulatory Flexibility Act
Impact Tax Regulations?, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (Jan. 2, 2020), https://
procedurallytaxing.com/how-does-the-regulatory-flexibility-act-impact-tax
-regulations [https://perma.cc/SL7J-UGEX] (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.,
GAO-18-256, FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATIONS: PROCEDURES FOR REVIEWS UNDER
REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT NEED TO BE ENHANCED (2018), https://www.gao.gov/
assets/690/689732.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPA8-Q239]); Velarde, supra, at 147
(quoting Professor Kristin E. Hickman).
183. Silver v. IRS, No. 19-cv-247, 2019 WL 7168625, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Dec. 24, 2019).
184. “Unexpected” because experts anticipated that the courts would continue rejecting plaintiffs’ pre-enforcement administrative claims against the Treasury for lacking standing. See Velarde, supra note 182.
185. Silver, 2019 WL 7168625, at *2; Velarde, supra note 182. The court also rejected the IRS’s contention that the plaintiff lacked standing under the causation element, finding “Plaintiffs are not challenging any specific regulation that might or might
not be traceable directly to the TCJA. Rather Plaintiffs allege that the agencies neglected to undertake procedural measures designed to protect small business from the
burden of unwieldy and cost-intensive regulations.” Silver, 2019 WL 7168625, at *2;
Velarde, supra note 182.
186. Silver, 2019 WL 7168625, at *1 (“In such cases, the redressability and imminence requirements of standing are relaxed.” (citing WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell,
738 F.3d 298, 305 (D.C. Cir. 2005))). Although the IRS additionally asserted that the
plaintiff failed the causation element of standing because his challenge to the regulations was actually an untenable challenge to the TCJA, the court disagreed, finding that
“Plaintiff’s alleged injuries are[] traceable to Defendants’ alleged violation of these separate statutory requirements, not the TCJA.” Id. at *2.
187. Velarde, supra note 182 (quoting Professor Kristin E. Hickman); see Bullock
v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144 (D. Mont. 2019); Chamber of Com. v. IRS, No. 1:16-CV-944,
2017 WL 4682049 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2017).
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Regardless, after surviving standing and the AIA,188 the plaintiff in Silver believes that he is all but guaranteed to win his APA suit.189 Some
practitioners already argue that Silver’s holding goes “beyond the PRA
and RFA” into generalized APA challenges against the Treasury.190
Silver thus contrasts directly with Bullock. While both cases
granted plaintiffs standing to challenge the IRS, Bullock relied on the
relaxed standing analysis for states, whereas Silver relied on the relaxed standing analysis for procedural injuries.191 As this Note will explore, the Silver opinion constitutes a more sensible approach to
standing analysis for procedural injuries, and the Bullock court could
have similarly granted standing to Montana under the procedural
standing analysis.
3. Contextualizing Contemporary Pre-Enforcement APA Tax
Standing Cases
These cases illuminate the current changing composition of
courts’ standing assessments in pre-enforcement APA challenges to
the Treasury. While there is a dearth of older caselaw on the subject,192 Bullock and Silver illustrate that the courts, post-Mayo, are increasingly granting standing to these plaintiffs’ APA claims. While it is
impossible to know how much of this modern jurisprudence reflects
a rejection of tax exceptionalism,193 it seems clear that courts’
188. While not the focus of this Note, the Silver court dismissed the IRS’s argument
that the AIA barred the plaintiff’s claim, relying heavily on Cohen. Silver, 2019 WL
7168625, at *2–3 (citing Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 730–31 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(en banc)).
189. Finley, supra note 173, at 156 (“‘The merits are a slam-dunk, and the Treasury
knows this,’ [Silver] said. Silver said a motion for summary judgment will come shortly.
‘We have them on the ropes.’” (quoting plaintiff Monte Silver)).
190. Velarde, supra note 182 (quoting Patrick J. Smith). Although Smith readily
notes that “the government would be eager to appeal.” Id. at 148.
191. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
192. See supra Part II.A.1.
193. If anything, these cases perhaps support a theory that the judiciary is beginning to embrace an anti-tax exceptionalist approach to Treasury claims of non-justiciability. Although Professor Kristin E. Hickman broaches the idea of “anti-exceptionalism,” her use of the term refers to supporters and detractors of the theory of tax
exceptionalism rather than an active willingness on the part of the judiciary to repudiate tax exceptionalism with a sort of reverse exceptionalism. See Kristin E. Hickman,
Bridging Exceptionalism and Anti-Exceptionalism with the JCT Canon, JOTWELL (Dec. 10,
2018), https://tax.jotwell.com/bridging-exceptionalism-and-anti-exceptionalism
-with-the-jct-canon [https://perma.cc/7G53-A5A6] (reviewing Clint Wallace, Congressional Control of Tax Rulemaking, 71 TAX L. REV. 179 (2017)).
Alternatively, one could argue that the Court’s newfound laxity for standing in
pre-enforcement administrative tax lawsuits actually represents a repudiation of the
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analyses have changed in some fashion. Indeed, the progression from
the courts’ earlier declaration that “[i]t is well-recognized that the
standing inquiry in tax cases is more restrictive than in other cases,”194
to the contemporary refrain that “[t]he IRS is not special in this regard;
no exception exists shielding it . . . from suit under the APA,”195 is striking in this regard.
Moreover, although it is hard to glean from so few cases whether
courts are in agreement about their standing analyses for pre-enforcement APA tax challenges. Bullock and Silver certainly take different
paths to grant the plaintiffs standing. A crucial question in the coming
years will be whether these early cases are the makings of a full jurisdictional split or merely minor disagreements about how best to afford such APA litigants standing.196
Regardless of whether these cases are indicia of a jurisdictional
split, it is worth examining their differences closely. To grant Montana
standing, Bullock relied on the special status of Montana’s statehood
under Massachusetts v. EPA.197 As discussed earlier, Massachusetts
represents something of an anomaly in the Supreme Court’s standing
jurisprudence (perhaps reflecting a tenuous compromise among the

“private-law” model of standing and a return to the “public-law” model. See supra note
115 and accompanying text.
194. Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir
1995).
195. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 723 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc).
196. Other courts have also struggled to apply consistent standing standards to tax
APA cases. See Texas v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 3d 810, 826–34 (N.D. Tex. 2018)
(relying upon 5th Circuit standing jurisprudence that “[o]nce an injury is shown, no
attempt is made to ask whether the injury is outweighed by benefits” (quoting Texas
v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015))); Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Lew, 733
F.3d 72, 89–90 (4th Cir. 2013) (granting plaintiff standing to challenge the ACA even
though its plans appeared to comply with the law and it therefore would not incur any
tax/penalty); Cummings, Standing To Sue, Part 2, supra note 126, at 329 (citing Liberty,
733 F.3d 72). See generally id., at 327–30 (collecting cases).
AICPA v. IRS serves as an especially poignant case-in-point; in AICPA, the plaintiffs
challenged an IRS procedure under the APA. The D.C. District Court dismissed, finding
that the plaintiffs lacked standing; the D.C. Circuit reversed; the District Court again
dismissed on standing—this time on different grounds—before the D.C. Circuit again
reversed, holding for the plaintiffs. Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. Accts. v. IRS, 746 F. App’x
1, 5–13 (D.C. Cir. 2018), rev’g 199 F. Supp. 3d 55 (D.D.C. 2016), rev’d, 804 F.3d 1193
(D.C. Cir. 2015), rev’g No. 14-1190, 2014 WL 5585334 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Sally P.
Schreiber, D.C. Circuit Upholds IRS Unenrolled Tax Preparer Program, J. ACCT. (Aug. 17,
2018), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2018/aug/dc-circuit-rules
-against-aicpa-in-tax-preparer-lawsuit-201819538.html [https://perma.cc/ES7C
-7Z7M].
197. Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1152 (D. Mont. 2019).
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Justices).198 In contrast, Silver utilized the procedural standing doctrine, “relaxing” the plaintiff’s burden for procedural injuries, specifically lessening his “redressability and imminence requirements.”199
That, of course, contradicts the earlier discussed Eastern Kentucky approach, which denied the plaintiff standing for failing the redressability prong, although Eastern Kentucky was decided before Lujan.200
B. POLICY PROBLEMS IN LIMITING STANDING FOR PRE-ENFORCEMENT APA
CHALLENGES TO THE TREASURY
Inconsistent standing analyses for pre-enforcement APA challenges to the Treasury cause problems, practical and theoretical, for
both plaintiffs and the Treasury. This Section analyzes some of the
various ways that the judiciary’s inconsistent standing analyses harm
both parties. Subsection 1 explores how inconsistent application of
standing deviates from the core judicial principle of stare decisis and
the ways that this negatively impacts litigants. Subsection 2 outlines
the specific problem of denying taxpayers the ability to contest their
liability pre-enforcement, effectively forcing them to ignore their
rights or expose themselves to civil, or potentially even criminal, liability. Subsection 3 discusses why procedural standing is an important
doctrine and deserves to be recognized by the courts. Finally, Subsection 4 documents various other policy tensions between limiting
standing and providing plaintiffs an opportunity to make APA challenges, including the separation of powers principle.
1. Global Doctrines Applied Inconsistently Undermines Stare
Decisis
Inconsistent and incomplete standing analyses are problematic
for the exact same reason that tax exceptionalism is and was.201 To
quote Mayo, “[T]he Court has recognized the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.”202
Our judicial system is rooted in precedent, or stare decisis, which promotes the core policy goals of predictability, stability, fairness, efficiency, and faith in the judiciary as “founded in the law rather than in
198. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
199. Silver v. IRS, No. 19-cv-247, 2019 WL 7168625, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 24, 2019).
200. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 45–46 (1976); Lujan v. Defs. of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
201. See supra Part I.A.2.
202. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 45 (2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154
(1999)).
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the proclivities of individuals.”203 The purposes behind the principle
of precedent apply equally to the uniform application of global or universal doctrines, ensuring a consistent application of law to similarly
situated plaintiffs, simplifying the application of complex rules, protecting the legal sphere from judicial bias and undue political influence, and promoting parties’ reasonable expectations via a predictable application of legal doctrine.204
While the standing doctrine outside of the tax realm is often already frustratingly inconsistent,205 the judiciary’s approach to pre-enforcement APA standing within the tax realm is even more inconsistent. A key example of this inconsistency is courts’ general,
although not ubiquitous, refusal to apply procedural standing doctrine to pre-enforcement tax challenges.206
Courts undermine the Treasury’s and taxpayer-petitioners’ reasonable expectations as to what result will ultimately be adjudicated
in the standing inquiry by inconsistently applying the standing doctrine in the tax-administrative sphere.207 Notwithstanding the fact
that recent cases have held for plaintiffs and against the IRS, Treasury,
and tax exceptionalism generally, courts are inconsistent in their use
of procedural standing (as distinct from traditional standing). The
court in Silver, for example, did focus on relaxed burdens for procedural injuries,208 whereas the Bullock court never even considered applying procedural standing.209
203. JOHN M. WALKER, JR., STAN. L. SCH.: CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT, THE ROLE OF
PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES: HOW DO PRECEDENTS LOSE THEIR BINDING EFFECT? 3
(2016), https://cgc.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2016/02/CGCP
-English-Commentary-15-Judge-Walker.pdf [https://perma.cc/7GKN-NQUF] (quoting
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986)); see id.; Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability
and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422, 423 (1988) (“Precedent decentralizes decisionmaking and allows each judge to build on the wisdom of others. In
a world where questions arise faster than information necessary to supply answers,
this is a boon. Precedent not only economizes on information but also cuts down on
idiosyncratic conclusions by subjecting each judge’s work to the test of congruence
with the conclusion of those confronting the same problem. This increases both the
chance of the court’s being right and the likelihood that similar cases arising contemporaneously will be treated the same by different judges.”).
204. See David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity and the Processes of American Law,
2013 BYU L. REV. 1191, 1220–22 (charting pros and cons to trans-substantive legal application, wherein the “form and manner of application does not vary from one substantive context to the next”).
205. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
206. See supra Part I.B.3; see also supra Part II.A.
207. See supra Part I.B.3; see also supra Part II.A.
208. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
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By continuing to inconsistently apply the standing and procedural standing doctrines in pre-enforcement APA actions against tax
agencies, the judiciary further enigmatizes the supposedly uniform
standing doctrine—propelling it from merely a “maze of often inconsistent statements” into a full-blown labyrinth.210 This inconsistent
application undermines stare decisis and, by extension, stability, fairness, efficiency, and faith in the judiciary.211
2. THE CATCH-22 OF DENYING PRE-ENFORCEMENT APA CHALLENGES TO
TAXPAYERS
The purpose of pre-enforcement review is to guarantee that regulated parties can challenge an agency rule without being forced to
break it and risk “civil and criminal penalties.”212 If a party could not
make such a pre-enforcement challenge, they would need to decide
whether to break the law, or whether to “abandon [their] rights.”213 A
party who cannot make pre-enforcement challenges is stuck in a
catch-22. Since the 1960s, pre-enforcement review of challenged
agency actions has been administrative law canon214—that is, canon
for legal subject areas other than tax and tax agencies.215
While the main rationale for denying pre-enforcement review in
the tax sphere has been the AIA, if courts stretch the standing doctrine
to deny pre-enforcement review, then a plaintiff is stuck in the exact
same predicament. After all, a non-justiciable claim on standing
grounds is no better than a non-justiciable claim on AIA grounds. This
Note does not advocate that courts should grant artificially relaxed
standing rights for pre-enforcement APA challenges. However, as
noted above,216 courts’ inconsistent application of standing, coupled
with a lack of emphasis on procedural standing rights, suggests that
plaintiffs’ pre-enforcement APA claims receive harsher standing analyses than they deserve. As courts have appeared to treat the issue of
210. HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 41, at 919 (explaining the laws governing standing for judicial review of agency actions).
211. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
212. Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967); see Kerska, supra note 59,
at 51.
213. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007); see Kerska, supra note 59, at 51.
214. See Abbott Lab’ys, 387 U.S. at 140–41 (holding that the APA allows for preenforcement review of agency actions when such review is not inconsistent with congressional intent).
215. See Kerska, supra note 59 (discussing how the AIA created a “pay first litigate
later” system that works to bar judicial review in federal tax law cases).
216. See supra Part II.A.
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standing in the tax world differently from other doctrines,217 there is
a risk that even if the AIA is held not to restrict plaintiffs’ pre-enforcement administrative challenges, the standing doctrine will fill the
AIA’s shoes in similarly denying such pre-enforcement claims.218
3. Procedural Standing Is Special
Failing to treat procedural claims of standing as special risks artificially foreclosing otherwise legitimate pre-enforcement administrative challenges to the Treasury. As Justice Scalia noted in Lujan, inquiries into procedural standing must be “special,” otherwise
plaintiffs will be de facto foreclosed from obtaining judicial review.219
In Silver, for example, but-for the court’s application of the lenient procedural standing doctrine, the plaintiff would almost certainly have
failed to satisfy the traditional injury-in-fact standing test, showing
that his injury-in-fact was definitely derived from and caused by
Treasury’s procedural foibles.220 In contrast, the Bullock court omitted
any mention of the procedural standing doctrine, despite being an obvious candidate for special procedural standing analysis.221 Plenty of
other courts beyond Bullock have similarly dismissed or ignored the
doctrine of procedural standing for pre-enforcement administrative
suits against the Treasury.222
Courts’ inconsistency in applying procedural standing analysis to
procedural claims, like pre-enforcement APA challenges to the Treasury, raises numerous issues. First, inconsistent use of standing doctrines erodes precedent and parties’ reasonable expectations, needlessly inducing additional costs and litigation.223 Second, judicial
217. See, e.g., supra note 138.
218. See Kerska, supra note 59.
219. See supra Part I.B.3; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
220. Silver v. IRS, No. 19-cv-247, 2019 WL 7168625, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Dec. 24, 2019);
see supra notes 115–23 and accompanying text.
221. Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1152 (D. Mont. 2019) (relying on Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007), to grant standing); see also supra notes 100,
121 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–52, 766 (1984) (holding that the
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that their injuries were “fairly traceable” to the IRS
actions); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37–39, 42–45 (1976) (declining
to reduce the threshold requirement to actual injury redressable by the Court); see also
Lu, supra note 138, at 101, 111 (discussing the chilling effect of Wright and Eastern
Kentucky on the ability to seek judicial review in cases involving federal tax law); Gene
R. Nichol, Jr., Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635,
637–42 (1985) (describing the Court’s application of an “unduly rigorous” causation
standard and its express reliance on separation of powers analysis as “troubling”).
223. See supra Part II.B.1.
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refusal to apply procedural standing analysis effectively bars plaintiffs
from making legitimate challenges to faulty agency regulations.224
This, in turn, undermines the core purposes of the APA to serve as a
check on agencies225 and exacerbates the dilemma of plaintiffs having
rights but not remedies against an agency.226
These issues are magnified in the tax context, where the Treasury
has a history of successfully ignoring APA requirements and pre-enforcement administrative lawsuits deriving from the APA.227 There
exists a paucity of tax pre-enforcement APA standing jurisprudence,
further confusing what precedent should apply in this context and
when;228 and this uncertainty only induces additional litigation
against the Treasury, which further undermines its ability to function
successfully.229 Thus, inconsistent application of the procedural
standing doctrine, especially in the post-Mayo tax context, unnecessarily harms both taxpayer-petitioners and tax agencies.
4. Policy Tensions Between Tax Exceptionalism and Standing
Besides problems of judicial inconsistencies in conducting the
standing analyses described above,230 there are three additional core
policy tensions between tax exceptionalism and expanding access to
standing for pre-enforcement APA claims against tax agencies.
First is a concern over separation of powers. Recalling that separation of powers is at the core of the standing doctrine,231 the judiciary
arguably should not utilize standing to promote the consolidation of
powers within a single government branch.232 Yet the primary effect
of tax exceptionalism is to insulate Treasury regulations from public
oversight, effectively minimizing the separation of taxation powers.233
224. See supra Part II.B.2.
225. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
226. See infra Part II.B.3.
227. See supra notes 55–61 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
229. See infra notes 239–44 and accompanying text.
230. See supra Part II.A.
231. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
232. See Lu, supra note 138, at 110 (“[W]here such a judicial check is only available
to regulated entities, the risk of agency capture arises. Therefore, in tax, as in other
administrative contexts, broader standing in federal court remains essential to correct
an imbalance in regulatory stakeholder power and enforce congressional mandates in
the implementation of regulatory schemes.”).
233. See supra note 138; Hoffer & Walker, supra note 63, at 271–73 (“[T]he Tax
Court has impermissibly substituted its judgment for the discretionary and equitable
judgment of the IRS. Indeed, contrary to congressional command, the Tax Court
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Tax exceptionalism’s function to insulate the Treasury from administrative procedural challenges undercuts the APA’s core mission of allowing a public separation of powers check on administrative agencies as well.234 Relatedly, tax exceptionalism also undermines the
foundational legal concept that “every right . . . must have a remedy.”235 While disentangling tax exceptionalism from the standing
doctrine from the APA in this context is a Sisyphean task, scholars
posit,236 and the inconsistent standing inquiries described above support,237 the theory that tax exceptionalism does influence the judiciary’s standing inquiry.238 Thus, there exists a very real concern that
tax exceptionalism infects the standing inquiry in the specific context
of pre-enforcement APA challenges to tax agencies, undermining the
theoretically trans-substantive nature of standing and undercutting
the separation of powers.239
Second, in direct opposition to the concern over separation of
powers, is the need to ensure an effective system of taxation—America’s primary revenue collection system.240 This “revenue imperative”
was the impetus for courts to allow the tax exceptionalism doctrine to

decides the issue anew, based on the evidence submitted to the Tax Court, as if the IRS
had not acted at all.”).
234. See supra notes 46, 49–51 and accompanying text.
235. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 147 (1803); see Hickman, supra
note 49, at 1203–04 (“Congress intended the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements
not only to facilitate government rulemaking efforts but also to protect individual
rights through public participation before agencies adopt binding regulations. Congress provided further for the protection of individual rights with the judicial review
provisions of the APA, which contemplate a broad judicial role in checking agency utilization of delegated power.”).
236. See supra note 138.
237. See supra Part II.A.
238. See supra Part II.A. In fact, the cases analyzed in that Part—Bullock and Silver—suggest that the pendulum has swung the other way, with at least a subset of
judges actively rejecting tax exceptionalism by aggressively voiding procedurally deficient regulations under the APA. See supra Part II.A.
239. See, e.g., Lu, supra note 138, at 97 (“Far from maintaining the separation of
powers, restrictive standing doctrine absolves federal courts of their unique duty to
interpret constitutional mandates and congressional enactments . . . . As a result, the
doctrine insulates government action against even congressionally authorized federal
court oversight under a range of citizen-suit provisions, including the APA.”).
240. See Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo
Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269, 279 (2012) (“[T]axation is different from and more important
than any other single federal activity. Revenue is the sina qua non for all other governmental activities. The modern welfare state could not exist without a robust tax system.”).
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flourish in the first place.241 Proponents of tax exceptionalism argue
that permitting APA pre-enforcement challenges will bog the IRS and
Treasury down in expensive, wasteful, time-consuming, and ultimately warrantless procedural red tape and litigation, limiting the
agencies’ ability to effectively perform their function of tax administration.242 Several recent administrative tax lawsuits starkly showcased this conundrum, demonstrating the potentially serious fiscal
ramifications that administrative law could wreak on an unprepared
tax system.243 Thus, there is an additional concern that a judiciary that
is increasingly amenable to administrative tax suits creates a slippery
slope that both incentivizes harmful litigation against the Treasury
while also stripping enormous funds from the federal fisc.244 Importantly, the additional requirements of APA compliance will impose
significant costs in time and money that the IRS, especially, does not
have.245
241. Id. at 279–80; see Lu, supra note 138, at 112–13 (“[R]epresent[ing] a pervasive theory that tax administration is fundamentally different from other administrative contexts because of its revenue-collecting purpose.”). See generally David Berke,
Reworking the Revolution: Treasury Rulemaking & Administrative Law, 7 MICH. J. ENV’T
& ADMIN. L. 353, 371–420 (2018) (responding to the prevailing pro-tax exceptionalism
arguments).
242. See Puckett, supra note 53, at 1074 & n.33, 1109–18 (“[S]tructural tax exceptionalism may have important benefits.”); McMahon, supra note 65, at 577–89; Hickman, supra note 49, at 1202 (noting critics’ fears that the APA “ossifie[s]” agency rulemaking (citing Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1410–26 (1992))); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways
to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 60–61 (1995).
243. See Altera Corp. v. Comm’r, 145 T.C. 91 (2015), rev’d, 926 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir.
2019); QinetiQ U.S. Holdings, Inc. v. Comm’r, 845 F.3d 555 (4th Cir. 2017). Altera and
QinetiQ both involved APA challenges to Treasury regulations where “[i]f the regulation were invalidated, the U.S. government would lose billions of dollars in tax revenue.” Susan C. Morse & Stephen E. Shay, The Ninth Circuit Reverses the Tax Court Decision in Altera, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (July 31, 2018), https://procedurallytaxing.com/
the-ninth-circuit-reverses-the-tax-court-decision-in-altera [https://perma.cc/967F
-JQVC; Bryan Camp, Tax Exceptionalism Lives? QinetiQ v. CIR, PROCEDURALLY TAXING
(Jan. 12, 2017), https://procedurallytaxing.com/tax-exceptionalism-lives-qinetiq-v
-cir [https://perma.cc/3J7V-AD4J].
244. See, e.g., supra note 65.
245. See, e.g., Jordan Weissmann, America Desperately Needs To Rebuild the IRS,
SLATE (Jan. 8, 2020, 5:19 PM), https://slate.com/business/2020/01/irs-audits
-revenue-declining.html [https://perma.cc/242D-292B] (noting that the IRS audited
just 0.45% of all personal income taxes in 2019—less than half of its 2011 audit rate—
due to budget cuts). Indeed, IRS Commissioner Charles Rettig has been explicit that the
IRS does not even have a sufficient budget to audit wealthy Americans—choosing instead, out of economic necessity, to audit “the poor.” Paul Kiel, IRS: Sorry, but It’s Just
Easier and Cheaper To Audit the Poor, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 2, 2019, 2:47 PM), https://www
.propublica.org/article/irs-sorry-but-its-just-easier-and-cheaper-to-audit-the-poor
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Third is a central tension over who makes tax law, what its purposes are, and whether tax is or should be “special.”246 While agencies
have long been afforded significant rulemaking discretion as experts,247 the APA requires agencies to solicit input from the public and
document their deliberations via public comments, effectively creating a public participation agency model.248 Tax scholars disagree over
whether tax agencies’ role as tax gatekeepers should be to open the
doors of tax administration to public participation or weld them shut
to increase internal efficiency.249 Relatedly, with the modern tax code
often effectuating normative executive policies and administering
much of the contemporary welfare system,250 some scholars have suggested that tax exceptionalism should apply only to traditional tax regulations and not “when Congress uses the tax code to accomplish objectives unrelated to core tax policy.”251
[https://perma.cc/LY6J-BHWH] (“[T]he IRS has no plan [to increase audits of the
wealthy] and won’t have one until Congress agrees to restore the funding it slashed
from the agency over the past nine years.”). Whether this congressionally imposed IRS
austerity should encourage continuing the tax exceptionalism doctrine is subject to
debate.
246. Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897,
1919 (2014).
247. See Wendy E. Wagner, A Place for Agency Expertise: Reconciling Agency Expertise with Presidential Power, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2019, 2023 (2015) (“[T]he basic concept that the agencies should preside over specialized information is hard-wired into
the design of the administrative state.”); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1404–05
(2013) (discussing the “expertise model” of administrative agency theory).
248. See Danshera Cords, “Let’s Get Together”: Collaborative Tax Regulation, 11
PITT. TAX REV. 47, 50 (2013).
249. Compare Puckett, supra note 53, 1109–12 (arguing that allowing for APA procedural challenges against the IRS and Treasury undermines the agencies’ efficiency—
detracting from their revenue raising expertise and instead requiring that they develop litigatory acumen), and McMahon, supra note 65, at 588 (“Instead of the current
one-size-fits-all format, procedure should be designed to recognize ‘varying levels of
expertise, different levels of public interest, and types of responses that typify the government regulatory process.’” (quoting Dorit Rubinstein Reiss, Tailored Participation:
Modernizing the APA Rulemaking Procedures, 12 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 324
(2009))), with Cords, supra note 248, at 108–11 (arguing for “collaborative rulemaking” and a definition of success “as giving taxpayers a greater voice in the development
of tax regulations”), and Hoffer & Walker, supra note 63, at 273–76 (“[U]nlike in other
regulatory contexts where the comparative expertise rationale may predominate
other policy rationales for judicial deference to agency action, this justification carries
somewhat less force with respect to the Tax Court’s review of IRS decisions.”).
250. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE
L.J. 1717, 1728–33 (2014).
251. Amandeep S. Grewal, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63 DUKE L.J. 1625,
1627 (2014).
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Empirical research suggests, however, that in “recent decades”
the tax code “ha[s] seen a dramatic escalation” in non-traditional tax
use.252 That tax agency regulations so heavily and regularly promote
non-tax aims should “give some pause to defenders of tax exceptionalism who base their arguments on the importance of raising revenue.”253
Finally, scholars disagree over whether tax, due to its substantively important revenue raising function, should be subject to special
jurisprudential treatment—i.e., tax exceptionalism.254 Some experts
even argue that the theory of tax exceptionalism is not actually exceptional because other agencies also enjoy their own versions of judicial
exceptionalism.255 This view, of course, is hotly contested in other taxadministrative scholarship.256
While these final tensions are not standing-specific, they are relevant both in raising questions over whether and to what extent tax
should adhere to uniform application of generalized legal doctrines
and whether and how courts should utilize the standing doctrine to
induce change.
In short, there are many compelling, but also competing, reasons
for universally adopting the procedural standing analysis to pre-enforcement administrative challenges to the Treasury. The procedural
standing approach allows putative plaintiffs to avoid the catch-22 of
either needing to risk civil or criminal liability or else avoid enforcing
their rights. Pre-enforcement challenges to NOPRs and other administrative infirmities also incentivizes (or forces) the Treasury to solicit
and utilize public comment in crafting tax policy—a boon for public
input and for the separation of powers principle. While there are legitimate concerns to easing the ability of taxpayers to challenge preenforcement administrative rules and regulations—namely time and
money—these concerns pale in comparison to the benefits to the uniform application of administrative rules, as well as benefits to taxpayers and the public generally.

252. Hickman, supra note 250, at 1728, 1747 (finding empirically a “substantial
portion” of recent tax agency rulemaking projects relate to non-tax policy objectives).
253. Id. at 1761.
254. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
255. See Zelenak, supra note 246, at 1910–13, 1918–20 (“[T]ax is special—at least
in the sense that every legal specialty is special, but also in the stronger sense of being
more special than the average specialty.”).
256. See, e.g., Caron, supra note 65, at 590; Alice G. Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein,
Tax: Different, Not Exceptional, 17 ADMIN. L. REV. 663, 715–17 (2019); Hickman, supra
note 57, at 93.
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Whether the courts embrace the procedural standing analysis or
not, courts should strive to apply standing uniformly to all plaintiffs to
limit waste and uncertainty. As we have already seen with Bullock and
Silver, even when the judiciary has attempted to ease plaintiffs’ ability
to establish standing, the courts have not excelled at applying standing
doctrines uniformly.
III. COURTS SHOULD APPLY STANDING ANALYSIS—INCLUDING
THE PROCEDURAL STANDING ANALYSIS—UNIFORMLY TO PREENFORCEMENT TAX APA CHALLENGES
The judiciary’s inconsistency in applying the procedural standing
doctrine to pre-enforcement APA challenges against the Treasury creates needless and harmful problems. The judiciary should replace this
inconsistency with a uniform approach, allowing plaintiffs to establish
standing if they bring legitimate procedural injuries and survive the
relaxed procedural standing inquiry. While this approach argues for a
uniform application across all doctrines, tax and non-tax, this solution
is based around application of the procedural standing doctrine as applied to the Treasury, because of current confusion over whether procedural standing applies in the tax context.
This Part argues for a clear and consistent use of the procedural
standing doctrine which will promote, rather than undermine, the tax
system. Section A argues that courts should use the procedural standing analysis for pre-enforcement APA actions against the Treasury.
Section B applies the procedural standing doctrine to two examples,
illustrating where and how courts should apply this relaxed procedural standing inquiry. Section C addresses counterarguments, finding that the benefits from the use of the procedural standing doctrine
for pre-enforcement tax APA suits outweigh any drawbacks of applying the doctrine.
A. COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE PROCEDURAL STANDING DOCTRINE TO PREENFORCEMENT APA CHALLENGES AGAINST THE TREASURY
The courts’ inconsistent analysis of the standing inquiry and use
of the procedural standing doctrine is problematic for numerous reasons. Inconsistent standing application (1) threatens to place putative
petitioners in a catch-22 of either needing to abandon their rights or
risk penalties;257 (2) creates poor precedent regarding the commonplace procedural exception to the traditional standing rule, in turn
creating additional problems, such as allowing for rights without
257. See supra Part II.B.2.
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remedies;258 (3) in the tax context, further confuses the field, increasing the opacity of tax exceptionalism and petitioners’ ability to bring
an APA claim against the Treasury, ultimately harming every party in
the process;259 and finally, (4) in the pre-enforcement APA tax context,
disrupts a theoretically uniform, global doctrine, creating a cascade of
further problems.260
This inconsistent application of pre-enforcement APA standing,
particularly in the tax context, with its history of tax exceptionalism,
is thus problematic and should be corrected going forward. For as
simple as the standing inquiry is in theory,261 the carve-outs, exceptions, complications, and relatively recent major changes aggregate to
form a complex and nebulous doctrine.262 Adding courts’ inconsistent
standing analyses of pre-enforcement tax cases unnecessarily further
taints this already confounding doctrine.263 Indeed, instead of injecting additional tax-specific glosses on the standing question, courts
should focus on simplifying, clarifying, and annunciating their analyses as much as possible. That way plaintiffs, courts, and tax agencies
all benefit from increased levels of certainty about their litigating positions and avoid wasting time and money on needless lawsuits.264
Moving forward, courts conducting the standing inquiry for preenforcement APA challenges against the Treasury should embrace the
theory of the special procedural standing. Without special rules for
procedural injuries, these plaintiffs would be thrust into the problem
of having a right without a remedy—a right that Congress expressly
mandated.265
To conduct this procedural standing analysis, courts should carefully separate the elements of the standing inquiry into a four-step
process to determine: (1) whether the procedural standing doctrine
applies; (2) whether the plaintiff meets the relaxed injury-in-fact test;
(3) whether plaintiff sufficiently alleges causation; and (4) whether
plaintiff sufficiently alleges redressability.266
258. See supra Part II.B.3.
259. See supra Part II.B.4.
260. See supra Part II.B.1.
261. Recall Justice Scalia’s “What’s it to you?” definition of standing. See supra note
82 and accompanying text.
262. See supra Part I.B.1.
263. See supra Part II.A.
264. See supra notes 211–16 and accompanying text.
265. See supra note 235; 5 U.S.C. § 702.
266. While this Part—and this Note as a whole—relates specifically to pre-enforcement APA claims against the Treasury, much of this analysis translates to other preenforcement administrative actions. Additionally, this Part assumes that the AIA does
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1. Determining Whether Procedural Standing Applies
First, the court must assess whether the plaintiff’s purported injury is sufficient to fall under the category of procedural injuries. As
this Note focuses specifically on pre-enforcement APA challenges
against the Treasury, almost all relevant pleadings should be procedural in nature. However, the court should ensure that if, for example,
a plaintiff brings multiple claims, only their procedural claims are afforded special standing status. Alternatively, if a plaintiff’s “procedural” pleadings are inchoate or illegitimate for some other reason,
then the court need not apply the relaxed procedural standing analysis.
2. Applying the Relaxed Procedural Injury-in-Fact Analysis
If the injury does fall into the procedural injury bucket, the court
must then determine whether plaintiff’s alleged injury is sufficient to
satisfy the injury-in-fact test with procedural modifications. Establishing a procedural injury requires only that a plaintiff establish a “risk
of harm” from procedural errors.267 Such a procedural injury can be
merely “esthetic,”268 or “[t]he deprivation of information,”269 or something as simple as “living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam . . . [that] fail[ed] to prepare an environmental impact statement.”270 In short, if the court determines that
a plaintiff’s injury is procedural, then it should likely find that the

not fully bar pre-enforcement APA challenges against the Treasury. See supra notes
73–77 and accompanying text.
267. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016) (“[T]he violation of a
procedural right granted by statute can be sufficient . . . to constitute injury in fact.”).
Under the procedural standing inquiry, the plaintiff need not demonstrate that their
injury is “imminent” as they would under the traditional standing doctrine. Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). In contrast, under the traditional injuryin-fact analysis, the Supreme Court has interpreted the “imminence” prong to require
that a plaintiff’s alleged injury must be “certainly impending”—which, while providing
some flexibility for future injuries, requires a definiteness that is difficult to establish
for procedural injuries. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (“‘Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose . . . .’ Thus, we have repeatedly reiterated that ‘threatened injury must
be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of possible
future injury’ are not sufficient.” (second alteration in original) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2; and then quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S.
149, 158 (1990))).
268. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562.
269. Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1150 (D. Mont. 2019).
270. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
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agency’s action constitutes an injury-in-fact, as long as the rule or regulation stands to directly impact the plaintiff.
3. Applying the Causation Prong
If the plaintiff establishes a procedural injury, the court must then
ensure that the plaintiff demonstrates a proper causal connection between the agency’s action and the alleged injury.271 While this inquiry
is not specifically augmented by the procedural standing doctrine,
there is some flexibility inherent in its analysis. If a plaintiff is able to
establish a procedural injury, they will likely have de facto established
causation. Simply showing that the agency’s actions caused the alleged
procedural injury is sufficient to establish this prong.272
4. Applying the Relaxed Redressability Analysis
Finally, if the plaintiff can demonstrate a procedural injury and
causal connection, the court must evaluate whether the plaintiff

271. Recall that the traditional test evaluates whether the injury is “fairly traceable
to the challenged action of the defendant.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000).
272. In Silver v. IRS, for example, the IRS argued that the plaintiff’s injury was not
caused by the agency, because the Treasury was simply promulgating regulations on
behalf of Congress’s directives from the TCJA. No. 19-cv-247, 2019 WL 7168625, at *2
(D.D.C. Dec. 24, 2019). The Silver court rejected this argument, holding that the plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the TCJA but were caused specifically by the IRS’s
regulations which allegedly violated the APA. Id. (“Plaintiffs are not challenging any
specific regulation that might or might not be traceable directly to the TCJA. Rather,
Plaintiffs allege that the agencies neglected to undertake procedural measures designed to protect small business from the burden of unwieldy and cost-intensive regulations . . . . Plaintiff’s alleged injuries are therefore traceable to Defendants’ alleged
violation of these separate statutory requirements, not the TCJA. Causation is easily
satisfied.” (citations omitted)).
Some courts occasionally utilize a heightened causation test for procedural standing. See, e.g., Ctr. for L. & Educ. v. Dep’t of Educ., 396 F.3d 1152, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(holding that “[t]he chain of causation between the alleged procedural violation and
the concrete interest is speculative at best” and that a “prospective plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant caused the particularized injury, and not just the alleged procedural violation”). The analysis used by the D.C. Circuit in Center for Law &
Education, however, is not widely applied. See Pierce, supra note 107, at 11–12. Scholars have assailed the Center for Law & Education opinion as “flawed on many grounds.”
Id. at 13; see id. at 11–17. Specifically, the D.C. Circuit—applying the procedural standing inquiry—confused causation with redressability, wrongly holding that “[a]ppellants must allege injury beyond mere procedural misstep per se to satisfy standing in
a procedural-rights case.” Ctr. for L. & Educ., 396 F.3d at 1160; Pierce, supra note 107,
at 13–14.
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satisfies the relaxed procedural redressability requirement.273 While
the procedural standing relaxations are intended to lower the plaintiff’s burden to satisfy what would otherwise be an impossible barrier
for procedural injuries, this test is not intended to provide plaintiffs
with a free-pass. Constitutional standing is a ubiquitous requirement
for all plaintiffs.274 Courts use a plausibility test to assess redressability, determining whether the plaintiff alleged claims which “might
plausibly have changed the outcome of a substantive dispute.”275
So long as a plaintiff can demonstrate that it is plausible that a
court may redress their injury, the plaintiff’s claim is sufficiently redressable. This plausibility threshold is a low bar, as “it is almost always plausible that the provision of a procedural safeguard will
change the outcome of a case.”276 Because the court can almost always
vacate and remand an agency’s faulty procedural action, the court is
almost always able to redress a plaintiff’s injury.277
Easing the redressability prong makes sense for procedural injuries. Otherwise plaintiffs alleging a procedural violation would almost
never be able to establish standing, as they would perpetually fail the
redressability element.278 While it is almost always plausible that rectifying a procedural failure could change the outcome of a case, a
plaintiff will almost always be unable to show that a favorable court
action will absolutely remedy their situation. A court can never
273. The traditional standing inquiry requires plaintiff to show redressability that
is “‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative.’” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (quoting Simon
v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976)).
274. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
275. Pierce, supra note 107, at 2–3. While Pierce describes these tests within the
causation prong of standing, they fit more naturally under the redressability prong—
indeed, the sole other test that Pierce documents he criticizes as being based around
redressability rather than causation. See supra notes 115–18. Additionally, utilizing
this test under the redressability prong clarifies why it is an “easy-to-meet” test, because the redressability element is relaxed. Pierce, supra note 107, at 8; Lujan, 504 U.S.
at 572 n.7. While Pierce describes the Center for Law & Education v. Department of Education’s alternative “possibility standard,” it clearly does not relax the redressability
requirement as the procedural standing analysis mandates. Pierce, supra note 107, at
2, 11–13; see also Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 450 (1989) (“We likewise find untenable the . . . claim that appellants lack standing because a ruling in their
favor would not provide genuine relief.”).
276. Pierce, supra note 107, at 3.
277. See id. at 13 (“In the context of most agency actions, a court can redress an
injury only by vacating and remanding the agency action with instructions to the
agency to correct the error that led to the judicial rejection of the agency action. Courts
routinely hold that an injury caused by an agency can be redressed by a judicial decision that vacates and remands the agency action.”).
278. See, e.g., Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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guarantee (or prevent), for example, that the agency would not later
re-issue the rule or regulation under proper APA procedures.279 This
is especially true for pre-enforcement challenges where a plaintiff
merely faces a future risk rather than a present injury. Taking again
the same example of Lujan’s dam-neighbor’s omitted environmental
impact study,280 a plaintiff there would almost certainly be unable to
establish a redressable claim as the dam would not even be built for
many years. Yet, this redressability was no barrier at all for Justice
Scalia to grant the hypothetical plaintiff standing.281
In sum, courts should adopt the procedural standing requirement
for plaintiffs making pre-enforcement APA challenges to the Treasury.
Once a court determines that such plaintiffs qualify for the procedural
standing analysis, the court should go step-by-step to ensure that the
plaintiff meets the relaxed requirements to establish standing. As described above, these requirements are not onerous; most plaintiffs
should be able to easily establish the necessary elements for procedural standing.
B. ILLUSTRATING THE PROCEDURAL STANDING DOCTRINE
The procedural standing doctrine is an abstract concept that is
difficult to fully embrace in solely abstract terms. While Justice Scalia’s
dam hypothetical is a useful illustration,282 this Section provides additional examples of how courts should apply the procedural standing
doctrine going forward. Subsection 1 revisits the case of Bullock v. IRS,
arguing that the court should have applied the procedural standing
doctrine to assess Montana’s standing, rather than relying on Massachusetts v. EPA. Subsection 2 conducts the standing inquiry for the
plaintiffs in New Jersey v. Mnuchin, the case highlighted in the Introduction.
1. Illustration 1: Bullock v. IRS Revisited
In Bullock v. IRS, the District Court of Montana found that Montana had standing to launch a pre-enforcement APA suit against the
IRS only because of Montana’s special status as a state under Massachusetts v. EPA.283 But the Bullock court ignored the procedural standing doctrine, relying solely on the state’s ability to satisfy standing
279. See, e.g., supra note 168.
280. See supra notes 111–14 and accompanying text.
281. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
282. See id.
283. Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1152 (D. Mont. 2019) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
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under the informational deprivation test.284 This information deprivation test, however, should not override the procedural standing doctrine.285 Moreover, the Bullock court should not have needed to rely
on the unstable doctrine of Massachusetts v. EPA to grant Montana
standing.286 Instead, Bullock could and should have found that Montana had standing under the relaxed procedural standing inquiry.
Montana properly alleged a procedural injury.287 The plaintiffs
properly alleged a pre-enforcement APA violation in that the IRS rescinded regulations which directly affected the plaintiffs without
proper APA notice-and-comment procedures.288 This is a clear-cut
pre-enforcement violation that should trigger the procedural standing
doctrine. The court should then have assessed whether Montana suffered an injury-in-fact under the procedural doctrine. This analysis
should not require Montana to have spent money combating the IRS’s
regulation rescission but simply should have determined whether
Montana suffered a “risk of injury.”289 Montana clearly alleged that the
IRS’s rescission created a risk of injury because Montana would no
longer be able to monitor its nonprofits’ donors’ substantial contribution information.290
After determining that Montana established an injury-in-fact, the
court should have then weighed whether this injury was “caused” by
the agency. There is no question that the IRS’s rescission of regulations caused Montana to experience its injury.291

284. This test was concocted by the D.C. Circuit in PETA v. Department of Agriculture. Id. at 1151 (citing People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t. of
Agric., 797 F.3d 1087, 1093–94 (D.C. Cir. 2015)).
285. The PETA court’s new test made little sense, see PETA, 797 F.3d at 1101 (Millett, J., dubitante) (“As this case illustrates, our organizational standing precedents now
hold that the required Article III injury need not be what the defendant has done to the
plaintiff; it can also be what the defendant has not done to a third party.”), and essentially did not implicate the APA or the procedural standing doctrine. The D.C. Circuit in
PETA not only found this allegation meritless but concluded that PETA could not even
establish judicial review under the APA for its flimsy allegations. Id. at 1098 (“[W]e
affirm the district court on the alternative ground that PETA failed to plausibly allege
that the USDA’s decade-long inaction constitutes agency action unlawfully withheld.”
(citing Munsell v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 509 F.3d 572, 592–93 (D.C. Cir. 2007))). The court
also held that PETA could not obtain judicial review under its APA allegations. Id. (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 61 (2004)).
286. See supra note 100.
287. See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 267–70 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 272.
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Finally, the court should have assessed whether Montana’s injury
was redressable. This too is an easy lift for Montana, who must simply
show that the court could remedy its problems. Considering that the
actual Bullock court fully invalidated the IRS’s rescission,292 Montana
should certainly satisfy this prong.
Montana would have easily satisfied the procedural standing test.
Instead, however, the actual Bullock court relied on Massachusetts v.
EPA to establish Montana’s standing under the theory that states have
special standing status as quasi-sovereign entities.293 This is a flimsy
doctrine,294 which the Bullock court used to dodge its own conclusion
that Montana lacked standing. There is no good reason that the Bullock court ignored the procedural standing doctrine, which would have
more properly granted standing to Montana.295 And, in contrast, there
are many good reasons that the Bullock court should have utilized the
procedural standing doctrine.296 While the Bullock court did find that
Montana had standing, its analysis was flawed. Instead of applying
Massachusetts v. EPA, the court should have conducted a straightforward application of the procedural standing doctrine to find that Montana had standing.
2. Illustration 2: New Jersey v. Mnuchin
While the court has not yet weighed in on New Jersey v. Mnuchin,
the case (described in the Introduction) of whether the IRS’s SALT tax
regulations were promulgated arbitrarily and capriciously and/or in
violation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act,297 the government will almost certainly assert that the plaintiffs lack standing. Just as in Bullock, the court here could rely on Massachusetts v. EPA to grant the
plaintiff-states standing; however, as in Bullock, the better option
would be to grant the plaintiffs standing outright under the procedural standing doctrine.
As a reminder, New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut are alleging that the IRS violated the APA through its issuance of new SALT
regulations pursuant to the TCJA.298 The plaintiff-states’ allegations almost certainly trigger the procedural standing doctrine. They argue
292. Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1159 (D. Mont. 2019).
293. Id. at 1152.
294. See supra note 100.
295. See supra notes 185–86 (noting that the Silver court did invoke the procedural
standing doctrine and found that plaintiff easily met the procedural standard).
296. See supra Parts II.B.1–4.
297. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
298. See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 7.
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that, while they have not yet been injured, the defendants’ actions will
injure them in the future, and their claim directly implicates APA procedures, which provide a right of judicial review. The plaintiffs can establish an injury-in-fact because they are at risk of harm from these
allegedly procedurally infirm regulations. This harm is clearly caused
by the IRS, as promulgators of the regulations. Finally, the court can
almost certainly redress the plaintiffs’ injuries by nullifying the regulations, for example. Thus, under the procedural standing doctrine—
which the plaintiffs qualify for—they should easily be able to establish
standing in order to adjudicate the merits of their claims. While the
plaintiffs are not likely to prevail on the merits of their case, they
should still be granted this opportunity to be heard in a court of law.299
C. APPLICATION OF THE PROCEDURAL STANDING DOCTRINE SOLVES THE
STANDING ANALYSIS PROBLEMS OF PRE-ENFORCEMENT APA CLAIMS AGAINST
THE TREASURY
The procedural standing analysis provides procedurally injured
plaintiffs a substantially easier path to standing than the traditional
standing inquiry. Although courts expressly relax only the injury-infact and redressability standing requirements, other elements of the
standing inquiry—like causation—are inherently easier to establish.
While some experts may find that procedural standing provides plaintiffs too easy a road to establishing standing,300 absent the “special”
procedural analysis, few, if any, plaintiffs who suffer procedural injuries would be able to establish standing to enforce their rights and
challenge agency abuses.301 Indeed, analyzing pre-enforcement APA
challenges against the Treasury under the procedural standing doctrine solves numerous problems embedded in the tax-standing inquiry. Below, Subsection 1 charts the numerous problems that procedural standing solves in the pre-enforcement APA tax agency context.
Subsection 2 refutes potential criticisms of this embrace of procedural
standing.
1. Special Procedural Standing Solves the Problems of Procedural
Injuries
There are a number of good reasons to embrace the special status
of procedural injuries within the standing inquiry. First, applying
299. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
300. Burt, supra note 85, at 285 (arguing that special rights for procedural injuries
undercuts Lujan’s main holding—“eviscerat[ing] the standing requirements of the
Constitution”).
301. See supra Part II.B.3; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
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procedural standing to pre-enforcement APA tax claims provides
plaintiffs a pathway to remedy their injuries. Under the traditional
standing analysis, pre-enforcement plaintiffs are perpetually hardpressed to establish the imminence and redressability prongs. For
courts to grant standing without the procedural doctrine, plaintiffs
will need to get lucky (or, potentially, enlist a state to sue on their behalf in order to enjoy the relaxed Massachusetts v. EPA standing analysis).302
Yet, providing a remedy for every wrong is a central tenant of our
judicial system,303 especially where the alternative is a catch-22 between plaintiffs abandoning their rights or subjecting themselves to
criminal and civil liability.304 Furthermore, these procedural “wrongs”
are issues that Congress has expressly identified as wrongs.305 Even if
one characterizes a procedural injury as a “lesser” injury, disallowing
plaintiffs from enforcing their congressionally provided rights and
forcing petitioners into impossible catch-22s is poor policy. By utilizing the procedural standing doctrine, the judiciary will alleviate plaintiffs’ catch-22 and allow for them to enforce their legitimate rights.
Second and relatedly, the courts should not usurp Congress’s role
by denying review for claims that Congress expressly directed deserve
review. The APA—congressionally enacted legislation—is extremely
clear in providing that “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of
agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review.”306 For courts to restrict plaintiffs’ ability to make pre-enforcement APA challenges against the Treasury on a standing basis, when
Supreme Court jurisprudence has already condoned procedural
standing as “special,”307 smacks of overriding congressional directives. Embracing the procedural standing doctrine, as the Supreme
Court and others have, provides the best of both worlds, granting
plaintiffs access to their legislatively established rights while also
comporting with stare decisis.
This leads to a third point: not only would utilizing the procedural
standing doctrine promote rather than usurp congressional legislation, but procedural standing in the tax context incentivizes the Treasury to follow the APA—an incentive that the Treasury still sorely
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.

See, e.g., Bullock v. IRS, 401 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1152 (D. Mont. 2019).
See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.2.
5 U.S.C. § 702.
Id.
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
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needs.308 With courts seemingly indicating that the Treasury is subject
to the APA the same as any other agency,309 the justiciability doctrine
of standing should not artificially circumscribe the procedural standing doctrine to shield the Treasury from APA challenges. Conversely,
allowing the standing doctrine to bar plaintiffs’ administrative claims
as non-justiciable will disincentivize the Treasury from properly following the APA. For courts to implement a strict standing inquiry here
would simply act as a second version of the AIA, de facto barring plaintiffs’ pre-enforcement administrative claims. This strict standing inquiry would undermine the now-widespread theory that the Treasury
can no longer violate the APA with impunity. Thus, courts utilizing the
procedural standing doctrine furthers the Supreme Court’s directive
that the Treasury be subject to the APA like any other agency.310
Fourth, utilizing the procedural standing doctrine will promote
increased uniformity for what should be a consistent, uniform doctrine of standing. As it stands, judicial application of the procedural
standing doctrine is woefully inconsistent.311 By more uniformly utilizing the procedural standing doctrine, courts can improve putative
plaintiffs’ and agencies’ reasonable expectations regarding their likelihood of obtaining judicial review, decrease wasteful litigation over
uncertain justiciability claims, and improve consistency, ensuring that
like plaintiffs are treated alike.312
2. Rebutting Counterarguments: Procedural Standing Does Not
Harm the Tax System & Procedural Standing Is No Weaker Precedent
than the Alternatives
Critics will lob two main counterarguments against broader utilization of the procedural standing doctrine. Primarily, critics will contend that the procedural standing doctrine ultimately harms the tax
system by greatly easing plaintiffs’ ability to make administrative
challenges against the Treasury, consequently decreasing the Treasury’s ability to promulgate regulations, leading to increased taxpayer
uncertainty. Additionally, these detractors will argue that increasing
plaintiffs’ ability to challenge the Treasury via the procedural standing
308. See supra note 56.
309. See supra notes 62–66 and accompanying text.
310. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011)
(“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax
law only. To the contrary, we have expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial review of administrative action.’” (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999))).
311. See, e.g., supra Part II.A.
312. See supra Part II.B.
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doctrine will harm the tax system by creating costly, time-consuming
litigation that the Treasury has neither the time nor the expertise to
handle, which detracts from the Treasury’s actual function of administering the federal tax system.
While there is certainly a tension between proper administration
of the tax system and taxpayers’ ability to obtain pre-enforcement review of administratively violative Treasury actions,313 providing special status for procedural injuries does not seriously nor fundamentally undermine the tax system. Here, the procedural standing
doctrine does nothing more than provide putative plaintiffs with a
reasonable path to challenging the IRS prior to the IRS expending resources on enforcement. Perhaps critics or the Treasury could argue
that by not allowing procedural injuries to survive standing, the injured party would not later re-litigate. Yet this “solution” places the
burdens of Treasury violations on the taxpayer and, moreover, looks
much like the status quo of tax exceptionalism which courts are in the
midst of rejecting.314 In addition, granting plaintiffs passage through
the justiciability hurdle of standing does not guarantee plaintiffs anything. If their claims are meritless, the Treasury can still dismiss plaintiffs’ claims easily.
While it is certainly good for taxpayers and the tax system as a
whole to have increased certainty over tax regulations, post-enforcement APA claims—which non-justiciable plaintiffs would then need to
bring and which would then later invalidate Treasury regulations—
arguably do much more harm to the certainty of the tax system. Thus,
the procedural standing doctrine, while encouraging more up-front
litigation, arguably provides taxpayers with certainty by challenging
invalid Treasury rules early on in the promulgation process.
Perhaps more importantly, as noted above, the doctrine of procedural standing helps incentivize the Treasury to adhere to the APA in
the first place, ensuring that its regulations are not later voidable by
the courts. Additionally, properly performed notice-and-comment
rulemaking assists the Treasury in gaining greater viewpoints and
perspectives, arguably improving regulations—and, as a corollary, the
tax system—overall.315 Moreover, Treasury regulations increasingly
313. See supra Part II.B.4.
314. See Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 55 (“[W]e are not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we have expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial
review of administrative action.’” (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154
(1999))).
315. See Cords, supra note 248, at 108–11.
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concern normative public policy matters; these, at least, should not be
subject to special tax rules.316 Finally, the Treasury is not and will
never be absolutely hamstrung by the APA—there may often be regulatory exceptions, falling under the good cause exemption, for example, which allow the Treasury to properly avoid the most onerous APA
procedures.317 Thus, while the procedural standing doctrine may allow plaintiffs to accelerate their administrative claims against the
Treasury, it actually can function to promote the tax system via improved public participation in the promulgation process; catch voidable Treasury regulations earlier on, whereby limit the public’s wrongful-reliance; increase the Treasury’s adhering to mandatory APA
procedures; and not limit the Treasury’s ability to utilize exceptions
to APA rulemaking.
Second, critics may contend that the argument for greater utilization of the procedural standing doctrine based on global uniformity is
overblown; after all, this Note acknowledges that the judiciary’s use of
the doctrine has been spotty. However, the alternatives to increasing
use of the procedural standing doctrine would lead to poor results.
One option would be to decrease or even eliminate use of the procedural standing doctrine altogether. However, this ostensibly eliminates many plaintiffs’ ability to remedy their injuries while undermining Congress and contradicting the Supreme Court.318 The other
alternative is, of course, to retain the status quo application of the procedural doctrine. Yet, as explored above, this creates its own set of
problems by increasing wasteful litigation, decreasing parties’ reasonable expectations, keeping putative pre-enforcement tax-APA plaintiffs in a catch-22, and ultimately undermining the core judicial policy
of stare decisis.319 In light of these two alternatives, taxpayers, the judiciary, and even the Treasury all benefit from a more uniform application of the procedural standing doctrine within the global realm of
standing.
CONCLUSION
Now that the era of tax exceptionalism, which has long promoted
the theory that tax is “special,” is over, courts must grapple with how
to impose longstanding administrative doctrines onto the historically
exempt Treasury. When it comes to pre-enforcement administrative
316. See supra notes 250–51 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 41.
318. See supra notes 305–06 and accompanying text; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
319. See supra Parts II.B.1–4.

2006

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1947

challenges, the judiciary should adhere to Mayo’s mandate that courts
should not “carve out an approach to administrative review good for
tax law only.”320 However, in order to effectively provide the proper
congressionally mandated administrative review, courts must embrace the procedural standing doctrine to ensure that pre-enforcement administrative plaintiffs, especially those using the APA to sue
the Treasury, have a seat at the table.
While the procedural standing doctrine has not yet been consistently applied, a uniform approach by the judiciary embracing the procedural standing doctrine would benefit all parties, inducing the
Treasury into compliance with the APA, rectifying the current pre-enforcement catch-22, and promoting the core judicial doctrine of stare
decisis. Whether or not the plaintiffs in New Jersey v. Mnuchin are ultimately successful in their gambit to eliminate the SALT regulations,
they should have standing under the special procedural standing doctrine to have their day in court and receive the opportunity to be
heard.321

320. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011).
321. See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.

